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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing trend throughout the country for parents to educate 
their children at home. Although the reasons are varied, most of these parents claim 
their interest in home education is based on religious views. The issue from both 
the legal and the educational point of view is whether the state's interest in assuring 
that children are provided a minimum level of formal education is more compelling 
than the parents' fundamental right to make choices regarding the manner in which 
their children are educated. The concern of all of the fifty states in the interest of the 
children is presented in their compulsory attendance statutes. More succinctly, the 
central question raised is this: Is the compulsory attendance requirement met by 
home education and, if so, under what conditions? 
In this research the terms "home instruction," "home education," and 
"hdtne study" are used to describe the educational experience parents provide to 
their own children in their home and under their own direction. 
Following are examples of accomplished people who were schooled at 
home: 
1 
Inventors: 
Artists and Writers: 
Industrialists: 
Scientists: 
Entertainers: 
Diplomats: 
Explorers: 
Presidents: 
Thomas Edison, 
Alexander Graham Bell, 
Orvill and Wilbur Wright 
Andrew Wyeth, Pearl Buck, 
Agatha Christie, Mark Twain 
Andrew Carnegie, 
Cyrus McCormick 
John Burroughs, 
Fredrick Terman 
Charlie Chaplin, Noel Coward, 
Brooke Shields 
Patrick Henry, 
Benjamin Franklin 
George Rogers Clark, 
Robert Peary 
George Washington, 
James Madison, 
John Quincy Adams, 
Andrew Jackson, 
Abraham Lincoln, 
Woodrow Wilson, 
William Harrison, 
Franklin Roosevelt 
2 
Military Leaders: 
Supreme Court Justices: 
George Patton, 
Douglas MacArthur 
Sandra O'Connerl 
3 
Since the early 1970's the press has often featured articles on students 
entering Harvard and Yale after eleven and twelve years of being educated at 
home.2 Newspaper articles throughout the country present to the public case 
studies of children whose parents have made the decision that home instruction is 
the best choice for their families. The prevalence of the situation is difficult to 
measure, but estimates are as low as ten thousand to as high as one million children 
who are currently receiving instruction from their parents at home.3 Parents fear 
being identified because of the possible legal implications and consequences. 
Legal ramifications vary from state to state. Each state enacts its own 
compulsory attendance laws, and each is responsible for establishing the statutory 
requirements for educating its own student population. Twenty-six states have 
specific statutory language dealing with home education.4 There are five states with 
no statutory language referring specifically to home education or direction from the 
I Raymond Moore, The School at Home, 84-7 MOODY MONTHLY,(March 1984): 19; 
James Stronge and Mildred Moser, "Home Schooling: A Trend for the Future, ILLINOIS 
PRINCIPAL, 8 (May 1987); JOHN WHITEHEAD AND WENDELL R. BIRD, HOME EDUCATION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES 23-24 (Westchester, II: Crossway Books, division of Good 
News Publishers, 1984). 
2WHITEHEAD AND BIRD, supra note 1, at 17. 
3JOHN NASBITT, MEGATRENDS 144 (New York: Warner Books 1982). 
4 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, Wyoming. Alaska's explicit language refers to correspondence programs as part of the 
public school system. 
4 
court, leaving the schools and parents to make choices that may be resolved by the 
courts.5 
In many states both school administrators and parents are confused about 
the rights and responsibilities of each group. Parents interested in home instruction 
seek information about how to provide this opportunity to their children. School 
administrators are unclear about their responsibility to meet the compulsory 
attendance statutes. Too often this gap in the law creates a hostile relationship 
between parents and school administrators. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Historically education of children has been a matter of personal discretion. 
Indeed our legal and social structure is based on the English common law where 
Lord Blackstone wrote that parents have both a right and an obligation to direct the 
intellectual and moral upbringing of their children. 6 "It is the duty of the parents," 
he asserts "to give their children an education suitable to their station in life. "7 
Since the Civil War states have begun to legislate compulsory attendance. 
Since the late Nineteenth Century enforcement of compulsory attendance 
laws has taken place. One strong impetus has been to "Americanize" the large 
number of immigrants entering the country. Several court cases supported the 
5 Alabama, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma. 
6J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE PART ONE: RIGHTS OF PERSONS RIGHTS 
OF THINGS 89-91 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959). 
7Id 
5 
constitutionality of compulsory schooling on the grounds of "welfare of the minor" 
and on the basis that education safeguards the welfare of the community and the 
safety of the state. 8 
The decisions of the higher level courts in each state have served as the 
guide for opinions given in other courts regarding home instruction. The courts 
have attempted to balance the parents' rights with the interest of the state. The state 
courts make their decisions based on their state statutes; yet the fundamental 
principle of law is that the federal constitutional law must be observed in all cases. 
This is true despite the fact that the Supreme Court has made it clear that education 
is, in the final analysis, a function of the state. In San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez the Court held that education is not a fundamental right 
provided by the United States Constitution, but educating children is a legitimate 
state function to be carried out in compliance with constitutional safeguards.9 
Today parents throughout the country are educating their children at home 
for religious, philosophical, and personal reasons. The courts will continue to deal 
with the inevitable conflicts between the compulsory attendance laws first 
developed in the 1800's and the inherent parental rights protected by the 
Constitution and the state statutes. Proponents of home instruction disclose the 
underlying issue as that of "(W]hether there is room for diversity in American 
8Thomas Carrere, Legal Aspects of Home Instruction, paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the Southern Regional Council on Educational Administration 2 (Knoxville: 
November 1983). 
9san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
6 
room to define what a child's education is to be?"lO Courts in each state have made 
decisions based upon the specific regulatory and statutory provisions of that state, 
especially as these provisions relate to compulsory attendance statutes. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine home instruction from a 
national perspective. This examination includes an analysis of the applicable 
statutory and case law, including pertinent data gathered from representative states. 
The results of the research are directed to states such as Illinois where there is 
confusion among parents and school administrators regarding their rights and 
responsibilities in the area of home instruction. 
NEED FOR THE STUDY 
Several law review articles have been written regarding the analysis of 
home instruction statutes and case law. These studies provide an excellent basis for 
this research but do not provide the direct linkage to specific legislative guidelines 
for a state such as Illinois that does not have statutory language explicitly 
establishing regulations for home instruction. In these states judges--not 
legislators--develop the legal precedent over several cases as to the public policy 
regarding home instruction. There has been no identified research looking at home 
l°E. Alice Law Beshoner, Home Education in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49-2 
UMKC LAW REVIEW 205 (1980). 
7 
instruction from the national perspective and then relating it to the process a specific 
state may use in developing statutory law and the attendant policies, rules, and 
regulations. In 1980 the compulsory attendance statutes of thirty states provided no 
language about home schooling. During the legislative sessions of 1987 and 1988 
thirteen states have amended their laws governing home education.11 Updated data 
regarding these amended statutes must be obtained and analyzed as related to case 
law. It is important to determine what legislative action has followed court action. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The First Research Objective is to review and analyze the compulsory 
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with 
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognize and permit home 
instruction. Data for this analysis are gathered from several sources: 
--The statutes and regulations themselves with an examination of the 
legislative history in appropriate cases, 
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and 
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments 
of education as well as representatives of professional organizations. 
The Second Research Objective is to review and analyze the relevant 
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past 
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century. 
llArkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia. 
8 
This analysis describes trends and identifies those issues which are most often 
addressed by the courts' attention: 
--Inherent parental rights regarding education, 
--Interest of the state regarding education, 
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment), 
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes (United States 
Constitution, fourteenth amendment), 
--Burden of proof, 
--Equivalency of home instruction, and 
--Qualifications of instructor. 
The cases are then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and 
regulations in the respective states to determine what if any legislative action 
follows the court action. 
The Third Research Objective is to trace in seven specific states, through 
further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation. Specific 
attention in these case studies is directed to the political or lobbying efforts, if any, 
that influence such legislation and to identify the most desirable elements of model 
legislation and/or administrative procedures. 
PROCEDURES 
This study is primarily descriptive in nature using appropriate qualitative 
methods to obtain data. Methodological triangulation, "the use of multiple methods 
to study a single problem or program," has been used to gain information from 
9 
legal sources including data from those involved in regulating home instruction.12 
The three methods are survey, interview, and legal research. This methodology 
identifies what is currently occurring, past practice, and tabular data. In addition 
descriptive information has been obtained from several states to validate the data 
and identify the underlying cause for legislative or regulatory change. 
The compulsory education and/or home instruction statutes in the fifty 
states have been researched, compiled, and categorized. This information has been 
obtained from a survey sent to the fifty chief state school officers. The content 
validity of the survey was obtained by submitting the draft of the survey to eleven 
educators for their input (Appendix C). This group includes state department of 
education personnel who have worked with home education or nonpublic schools, 
university personnel, public school personnel, and contacts at professional 
organizations. As a result of their input a final survey was developed and 
distributed to the chief state school officers in the fifty states, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico to get specific information regarding the status of home instruction in their 
jurisdictions.13 A letter from the Chief State School officer in Illinois has been 
included with the survey to support the need for the study (Appendix C). The 
charts and narratives identified in the review of the literature have been used for 
input, but the information has been verified by direct examination of the statutes and 
accompanying laws. 
12MJCHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION METHODS 109 (Beverly 
Hills, Sage Publications, 1980). 
13Guam and Puerto Rico were not in the final research because of the lack of supportive 
documentation. 
10 
Legal research tools have been used to uncover appropriate cases which 
interpreted statutory language concerning the state's responsibility for education and 
the parents' rights concerning their children's education. Court decisions involving 
home instruction, as well as the compulsory education statutes and administrative 
rules and regulations from the states, have been analyzed, compared, and 
contrasted. Illinois court decisions will receive particular attention to determine if 
an Illinois "public policy" is identifiable. 
Follow-up telephone interviews have been conducted with designated 
personnel in seven state education departments.14 The purpose of the interviews is 
to validate the data already collected and to find information regarding the political 
forces that have affected the legislative process. The criteria used in identifying 
these seven states includes: 
a. Significant developments in the past ten years, 
b. Geographic diversity, 
c. Availability of historical materials, and 
d. Availability of current data. 
As a result of the research, the most desirable elements of model 
legislation and/or administrative procedures have been identified. It is the intent that 
this effort will aid local districts, state agencies, and lawmakers to develop policies 
and laws about home instruction. 
14rowa, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. 
11 
DEFINIDON OF TERMS 
Against public policy--When the law refuses to enforce or recognize 
certain classes of acts on the grounds that they have a mischievous tendency, so as 
to be injurious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality.15 
Burden of proof--In the law of evidence, the necessity or duty of 
affirmatively providing a fact or facts in a dispute on an issue raised between parties 
in a cause.16 
Compelling state interest--the interest of the state which over balances a 
person's religious interest.17 
Compulsory education--Mandatory instruction as required by law. 
Due process--The course of legal proceedings carried out regularly and in 
accordance with established rules and principles.18 The fifth amendment provides 
for due process by the Federal government and the fourteenth amendment provides 
for due process by the state governments. 
Egual protection-The right provided by the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution which specifically prohibits a state from denying, "[T]o 
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." 
15HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 603 (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1983). 
16HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 178 (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1979). 
17KERN ALEXANDER AND M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOL, 
STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 23 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1984). 
l81ct. at 352. 
12 
Eguivalent education--Same value, effect, importance, and worth, but not 
necessarily the same form. 
Establishment clause--The first amendment provision that Congress shall 
make no law respecting establishment of religion. 
First amendment rights--The prohibition of states from passing laws 
which deny free exercise of religion.19 
Home instruction--The educational experience parents provides to their 
own children in their home and under their own direction. 
Home instruction laws--Statutes enacted by the respective state 
legislatures and rules and regulations promulgated by the state boards of education. 
Monitor--To keep watch over; supervise. 20 
Non-school alternatives--Learning arrangements which are not 
implemented in a physical facility commonly called "school."21 
Private schools--A school that is established, conducted, and primarily 
supported by a nongovernmental agency.22 
Public policy--The principle of the law which holds that no subject can 
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the 
public good. The term "policy" as applied to a statute, regulation, rule of law, 
19Joseph C. Beckman, Legal Challenges to Compulsory Education, SCHOOL LAW 
UPDATE 260 (1985). 
20WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 848 (Springfield, Mass., G. & C. 
Merriam Co. 1975). 
21LAWRENCE KOTIN and WILLIAM AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 110 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press Corp. 1980). 
22rd. at 916. 
13 
course of action, or the like, refers to its probable effect, tendency, or object, 
considered with reference to the social or political well-being of the state.23 
Rational basis test--An appellate court will not second guess the legislature 
as to the wisdom or rationality of a particular statute if there is a rational basis for its 
enactment. It has been said that the protection of the public from unwise or 
improvident statutes is to be found at the voting polls or by referendum, not in 
court.24 
Regulate--To control or direct according to a rule.25 
School--An organization that provides instruction.26 
Three prong test--The determination of whether a state law violates the 
establishment clause by asking: 1) if the purpose is secular in nature; 2) if the 
primary effect neither enhances nor inhibits religion; or 3) if it will foster excessive 
entanglement with religion.27 
Vagueness doctrine--The requirement that a criminal statute be sufficiently 
definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the behavior which is 
prohibited. Under this principle a law which does not fairly inform a person of 
what is commanded or prohibited is unconstitutional as violative of due process.28 
23BLACK, supra note 15, at 603. 
24Jd. at 655. 
251ct. at 1096. 
261d. at 1034. 
27Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
28BLACK, supra note 15, at 803. 
14 
LIMIT A TIO NS 
1. Only decisions of the state appellate and supreme courts and United 
States District, Appellate, and Supreme Court jurisdictions are included in the 
study. 
2. Only cases germane to home instruction and the state's role in 
education, particularly home education and/or private schools have been studied. 
Excluded will be cases involving private schools in which the issue has no direct 
relationship to home instruction. 
3. The study does not evaluate the academic effectiveness of home 
instruction. 
4. Only general information regarding home instruction have been 
obtained. There are no case studies of individual families. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I includes an introduction to the problem, the historical 
perspective, the need for the study, the specific research questions, and 
clarifications of the problem through the establishment of limitations and 
definitions. In addition Chapter I establishes the methodology utilized to investigate 
the study. 
Chapter II includes a compilation of the review of relevant literature that is 
divided into dissertations, legal writings and journals, and review of writings 
regarding litigatien. 
15 
Chapter III presents the responses to the three research objectives 
including the unique characteristics of the fifty states regarding the authority for 
home instruction. The data has been obtained by researching the pertinent statutes 
and cases and also through a survey and interviews. A comprehensive response 
has been completed in the form of an analysis of the court decisions and statutes 
organized by the categories of types of statutory law regarding home instruction. 
Within each category specific issues and cases have been analyzed as related to the 
statutes and rules and regulations. Pertinent Supreme Court decisions are also 
presented. 
Chapter IV presents the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of 
the most desirable elements of model legislation and/or administrative procedures. 
In addition recommendations for future study are presented. 
CHAPTER II 
REVlEW OF THE RESEARCH AND LITERATURE 
Legal researchers and other interested authors have studied the legal 
aspects of home instruction from a state and national perspective. While this 
research reviewed these papers, it sought to go further by providing legislative 
recommendations that could be included in state statutes or rules and regulations. 
Two law review articles on the subject analyzed the statutes of the fifty states and 
related that research to one specific state's legal situation.29 This research, 
however, reviewed, in addition to legal and educational writings, court cases and all 
current legislation relating to home instruction and compulsory attendance, 
proceeding then to relate the results of the research to Illinois. 
DISSERTATIONS 
The available research literature in the form of doctoral dissertations 
included descriptive data of curricula and methods used in home schools,3°case 
29 Gerald Lotzer, Texas Home Schooling: An Unresolved Conflict Between Parents and 
Educators 39 BAYLOR LAW REV. 469 (1987); Kara T. Burgess, The Constitutionality of Home 
Education 55 UMKC LAW REV. 55-61 (1986). 
30Beverly Ann Sollenberger, Case Studies of Four Families Engaged in Home Education 
(Dissertation, Ball State University, 1985). 
16 
17 
studies reporting on attitudes of school administrators,31 case studies of home 
schooling families,32 profiles of home school families,33 and a comparative study 
of home schoolers and a group of children traditionally educated, to identify 
differences in social/ emotional areas and academic achievement.34 One study 
looked at the activities of the national home school movement since 1970.35 
The only dissertation closely related to this study was one finished in 1976. 
Walker analyzed alternatives and exemptions to compulsory attendance provided by 
statutory and case law throughout the United States. Walker expressed concern 
over the true meaning of schooling. The Walker study determined, on a state-by-
state basis, the provisions of the compulsory attendance laws in 1976. Since that 
time thirty states have revised their compulsory attendance statutes. Walker's hope 
for the future was that "[T]he emphasis would shift from required attendance at a 
certain school, meeting given standards, to a desired product: educated youth. "36 
31 Michael Lindley, The Home Schooling Movement in the State of Indiana as Perceived 
by Public School Superintendents (Dissertation, Ball State University, 1985). 
32Norma Jean Feeman-Linden, An Investigation of Alternative Education: Home 
Schooling (Dissertation, East Texas State University, 1987). 
33Gunnar Arvid Gustavsen, Selected Characteristics of Home Schools and Parents Who 
Operate Them (Dissertation, Andrews University, 1981). 
34Mona Maarse-Delahooke, Home Educated Children's Social/ Emotional Adjustment and 
Academic Achievement: A Comparative Study (Dissertation, California School of Professional 
Psychology, 1987). 
35Michael Shepard, The Home Schooling Movement: An Emerging Conflict In American 
Education (Dissertation, East Texas State University, 1987). 
36Barry Dean Walker, Sr., Compulsory School Attendance: Alternatives and Exemptions 
Provided by Statutory and Case Law in Each of the Fifty States p. 270 (Dissertation, University of 
Cincinnati, 1976). 
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Walker's research was a comprehensive analysis of all compulsory attendance 
statutes and the exemption provided by those statutes. 
Because of the dearth of recent doctoral literature, it was critical to seek 
other sources. Therefore, law review articles, journal publications, and surveys 
were reviewed. 
LEGAL WRITINGS AND JOURNAL ARTICLES 
The legal writings and journal articles are presented in terms of the 
historical perspective of home instruction and the relationship to the compulsory 
attendance statutes. Although the percentage of students educated at home is small, 
concern among educators and interested parents is great regarding each group's 
rights and responsibility regarding home instruction. Each group has a valid 
interest--and an important responsibility. States such as Illinois that do not have 
statutory language explicitly establishing reasonable regulations for home 
instruction have been hotbeds for litigation. Over several cases judges--not 
legislators--have developed the legal precedent that is expensive, time consuming, 
and unnecessarily bitter.37 School administrators are understandably confused and 
parents are frustrated by the lack in many states of statutory definitions and 
37JAMES W. TOBAK AND PERRY A.ZIRKEL, Home Instruction: An Analysis of Case 
Law. 8 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW, 57 (Fall 1982), ERIC S. MONDSCHEIN AND 
GAIL PAULUS SORENSON, Home Instruction in Lieu of Compulsory Attendance: Statutory and 
Constitutional Issues, SCHOOL LAW UPDATE 260 (1982); Gerald Lotzer, supra note 29. 
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guidelines.38 Judges, in turn, have pointed their fingers at legislators' failure to 
establish regulations on home instruction. 
Beckham identifies the results of these concerns: 
Legal challenges to state compulsory attendance laws have 
emphasized four interrelated constitutional claims. Under 
provisions of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, 
parents have challenged the state's authority to require public 
school attendance in lieu of home instruction and private 
religious organizations have refused to comply with state 
regulation of nonpublic schools. Alternatively parents and 
religious organizations have asserted violations of the 
establishment clause of the first amendment in attacking state 
regulations of private religious school operations. In those cases 
in which state compulsory attendance requirements impose 
criminal penalties for nonconformance, challenges based upon a 
denial of fifth and fourteenth amendments due process have been 
addressed. Finally, parents have asserted a right to direct the 
education of the child under various constitutional theories 
implicating privacy, equal protection, and due process 
guarantees.39 
Statutory enactment is no guarantee that legal ambiguities and litigation will 
be avoided, as substantiated in New Hampshire. According to Stocklin-Enright, 
New Hampshire's compulsory education statute is the most strict in the country.40 
38Joseph C. Beckman, Legal Challenges to Compulsory Education, SCHOOL LAW 
UPDATE 271 (1985). 
39rct. at 260. 
40Brendan Stocklin-Enright, New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandary, 2 VERMONT 
LAW REVIEW 265 (1983). 
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Based upon the author's interpretation of the statute, there are only two choices for 
the student: public or private school. Home instruction has been discarded because 
of the burdensome expense of supervision. Ironically in 1980 the state educational 
agency developed Rules and Procedures pertaining to home education which called 
for proof of "a manifest educational hardship." Stocklin-Enright has questioned the 
statutory authority for the State Board of Education to develop these Rules and 
Procedures, noting: 
The senators who approved section 193:3 would have been very 
surprised if they had been told that their "clarifying amendment" 
authorized a major change in educational policy. From a 
clarification of the section 193:3 power to reassign children within 
the public school system, the Board has wrenched the power to 
start a home schooling program. The language of the section and 
its legislative history speak against such a novel and unintended 
interpretation. Home schooling may be desirable, but so is 
legality and adherence to the rule of law.41 
The uncertainty of the parents' constitutional role has been raised once 
again in an analysis of New Hampshire's statute, case law, and regulations. The 
legislators, working with parents and other educators, are the ones to remove the 
contradictions in the "administrative and legal commands."42 
Before 1987 Illinois was one of the seventeen states having no statutory 
provisions for home instruction.43 However, some of these states, including 
1987). 
41Jd at 278. 
42Jd. at 299. 
43Patricia Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, 68-7 KAPPAN, 510-518 (March 
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Illinois, have recognized the validity of home instruction by virtue of court 
decisions which define such instruction as a form of private school.44 
The constitutional issues involving religious liberty, separation of powers, 
and equal protection and balancing of the states' interest against parental rights have 
been the focus of several scholarly research articles. Burgess45 identifies the 
ground swell of interest in home education in the state legislatures and expresses 
concern regarding statutory language "passing constitutional muster."46 She also 
raised the issue of statutory authority for home education being unconstitutionally 
vague as it is in Missouri. The plaintiffs in the Missouri case, Ellis v. O'Hara,41 
argued that the state statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that "neither 
regulations nor guidelines have been promulgated to assist in the interpretation of 
this language. "48 The court agreed, finding that the parents were not given an 
adequate definition of "substantially equivalent" and that the legislature did not 
provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement. The court concluded that the 
statute did not comply with due process requirements and was unconstitutionally 
vague.49 The court stayed the effective date of the order until the close of the 
legislative session in 1986 to allow the Missouri legislature to enact new statutory 
44Indiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma. 
45Burgess, supra note 29, at 83. 
46rd. at 69. 
47612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
48rct. at 380. 
49rct. at 381. 
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language. A new statute with more concise language was adopted with the effective 
date of June 19, 1986.50 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
To have a clear understanding of home instruction, it was necessary to 
consider the origin of compulsory attendance laws and the early court cases 
involving parental rights for determining how their children should be educated. In 
1642 the Colony of Massachusetts Bay enacted the first compulsory attendance 
laws.51 "This statute required all parents and masters to provide an education both 
in a trade and in the elements of reading to all children under their care. "52 In 1648 
the Act was amended to lay the foundation for local taxation to provide support for 
schools.53 
The Massachusetts' compulsory literacy law of the 1640's has led to the 
development of the principles of today's American educational system which are 
identified in the comprehensive report of compulsory education statutes by Kotin 
and Aikman: 
SOMO. ANN. STAT.§ 167 031-167.071 (Vernon Supp. 1988). 
51LA WRENCE KOTIN and WILLIAM AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 11 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press Corp. 1980). 
521d 
53Id. at 13. 
1. The education of children is essential to the proper 
functioning of the state. 
2. The obligation to furnish this education rests primarily upon 
the parents. 
3. The state has a right to enforce this obligation. 
4. The state has a right to determine the type and extent of 
education. 
5. Localities may raise funds by a general tax to support such 
education.54 
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After a flurry of enactment of compulsory attendance laws, interest 
declined, and by the end of the 19th century these laws were repealed or not 
enforced. The colonists were preoccupied with the Indian wars, economic 
problems, and religious debates. In 1852 Massachusetts was once again the leader. 
The State enacted new general compulsory attendance legislation, "[R]equiring 
persons having any children under their control who were between the ages of eight 
and fourteen to send such children to school for twelve weeks annually, six weeks 
of which had to be consecutive."55 
The child labor laws in the early 1900's strengthened attendance laws.56 
By 1918 all the states had enacted statutes calling for parents to send their children 
to school or risk being penalized by imprisonment or fines. The justification for 
these laws was found in the states' police power to provide for general welfare.57 
54Id. at 19. 
55Jd. at 25. 
56Thomas Carrere, Legal Aspects of Home Instruction, paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the Southern Regional Council on Educational Administration 18 (Knoxville: 
November 1983). 
57Mondeschein and Sorenson, supra note 36, at 259. 
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However, after the Brown v. Board of Education58 decision in which the 
board was found in violation of its duty to desegregate its schools, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Louisiana repealed their compulsory attendance laws and 
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas exempted children whose 
parents objected to the child attending an integrated school. New York, Georgia, 
and Virginia also made changes in their compulsory attendance statutes during the 
late 1950's and early 1960's which "could conceivably be used as a means whereby 
to avoid sending a child to racially integrated schools. "59 
At the time of this research, every state has some form of compulsory 
attendance statute establishing the standards for attendance.ro 
COMPULSORYATTENDANCESTATUTES 
The report prepared by Kotin and Aikman, discussed above, not only 
provided a comprehensive analysis of the compulsory attendance laws and their 
development but also analyzed the relationship between the child labor laws and 
compulsory attendance.61 
The Education Commission of the States, Issuegram, cites the American 
Civil Liberties Union's position supporting home instruction, which states: 
58srown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
59walker, supra note 36, at 58. 
6°'foBAK AND ZIRKEL, supra note 37, at 13-14; Walker, supra note 36, at 33-35. 
61Kotin and Aikem, supra note at 51. 
We believe that in the interest of parental right to choose an 
alternative to public education, home instruction with 
safeguards, such as approval of curriculum testing of the child, 
should be extended to all jurisdictions because the state's interest 
in assuring minimum levels of education does not extend to 
control of the means by which that interest is realized. 62 
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The same article raises policy questions which should be considered as 
changes in compulsory education laws are contemplated. These issues include: 
1. Should compulsory attendance laws carry criminal sanctions 
against parents honestly acting in the best interests of their 
children? 
2. Should regulation of home instruction be left to local law 
enforcement agencies--or should legislatures provide some 
rules and give state or local school boards authority in this 
area? 
3. Are children instructed at home receiving what they need for 
good citizenship and self-sufficiency? 
4. Are these children unacceptably insulated from the 
mainstream of society, or do they have adequate 
opportunities for gaining social skills and a broader 
knowledge of society? If social isolation is a problem, what 
are the best ways to correct it? 
5. If home instruction is allowed, to what extent should states 
provide support? 
6. If local officials provide support, should states permit them 
to count home-tutored children in their enrollment figures?63 
62Patricia Lines, Home Instruction, ESC ISSUEGRAM, Education Commission of the 
States, Denver (August 1984). 
631d. at 6. 
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Kotin and Aikman's comprehensive writings regarding compulsory 
attendance reviewed the significant debate over the quality and viability of public 
education. The authors suggested that the repeal of compulsory attendance laws 
could result only if there was a public policy shift in the public financing of 
elementary and secondary education. 64 
The Home School Legal Defense Association has summarized--but not 
analyzed--applicable state statutes. The following note on the cover page of the 
Defense Association's publication sets forth the intent of the summary: 
This chart is not intended to be, and does not constitute, the 
giving of legal advice. Since many states have unclear 
compulsory education statutes, the courts vary on their 
interpretation of those statutes. Therefore, there is no guarantee 
the state will accept all options for compliance listed under each 
state. This analysis is not intended to substitute for individual 
reliance on privately retained legal counsel. 65 
A publication of the Education Commission of the States also included a 
chart of the various state statutory provisions.66 The Rutherford Institute had, 
according to the preface of the publication, "undertaken an exhaustive examination 
of home education situations in the fifty states. "67 
64KOTIN and AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 326. 
65CHRISTOPHER KLICKA, HOME SCHOOL STATUTE CHART OF 50 STATES 
(Washington, D.C.: Home School Legal Defense Association, August, 1986). 
66Education Commission of the States, Compulsory Education Laws and Their Impact on 
Public and Private Education-With Suggested Statutory Language, March 1985. 
67HOME EDUCATION REPORTER, Rutherford Institute, 1985. 
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Tobak and Zirkel included a tabular overview of the state statutes and 
attendant policies/regulations concerning home instruction. The primary source of 
the data was information obtained before 1980 by the New Hampshire State 
Department of Education. At that time fourteen states provided no exception for 
home instruction beyond the possibility of offering it as a private school, fifteen 
explicitly provided an exception for home instruction, and twenty-one states had an 
implied exception to public or private schooling based either on broad equivalency 
language or on narrower, marginal language. 68 
In 1986, Deckar began to survey the states and prepared, in chart format 
annually, the compilation of the data supplied by the states regarding specific 
information about home education.69 His STAIB BY STAIB HOME SCHOOLING 
MANUAL included requirements that must be met in each state to fulfill the 
compulsory education statutes. 
Kotin and Aikman also provided a tabular description of "Primary 
Learning Arrangements Which Meet the Attendance Requirements of the 
Compulsory Attendance Statutes." They indicated that the intent of the chart 
published in 1980 was to "address the distinction between permitted school and 
non-school learning arrangements. "70 Their information provided still another 
source for analysis of the statutes. 
68Tobak and Zike!, supra note 37, at 6-12. 
69STEVEN DECKAR, 1986 FIRST EDffiON HOME SCHOOLING LAWS: STATE BY 
STATE HOME SCHOOL MANUAL (DeKalb, II. 1986). 
70KOTIN and AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 345. 
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REVIEW OF ARTICLES RELATING TO LffiGA TION 
During the past ten years, law review articles and legal journals have 
included writings about litigation of home instruction cases. Generally, these 
writings provide (1) comprehensive overview of litigation; (2) categorization of 
cases and review of the case law; (3) analysis of constitutional issues; ( 4) impact of 
political forces; (5) analysis of case law in a specific state; and (6) identification of 
trends. 
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF LIDGATION 
Tobak and Zirkel's analysis of the statutes and case law presents an 
extensive view of the issues surrounding home instruction and ends by 
recommending a burden shifting approach.71 This approach involved first placing 
the burden on the state to show non-attendance and then on the parents to prove the 
educational equivalence of the home study program. They emphasized that: 
[T]he balanced approach takes into account both the state's 
interest in education and the parent's freedom to choose. In 
addition, and perhaps most importantly, it permitted a greater 
focus on the best interests of the individual child.72 
Any solution such as this must be determined by the one legal entity that 
can provide both specificity and the power of enforcement--the state legislature.73 
71 Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 6-10. 
721d. at 59-60. 
73carrere, supra note 56, at 18. 
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IMPACT OF POLIDCAL FORCES 
Tobak and Zirkel recommended that states should consider providing a 
limited statutory exception for home instruction while furnishing the proper due 
process procedural protection.74 History disclosed the political forces which have 
influenced the direction home instruction has taken in individual states. And, partly 
because of a fear of political implications, change has been slow. Carrere pointed 
to the influence of political forces when attempts were made to strengthen the 
compulsory attendance laws in Georgia. 75 That examination prompted this current 
research to analyze the political influences in other states and the resulting 
legislation. 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue 
of home instruction. Yet, its decisions in Pierce16 Yoder, 77 Meyer18 and 
74Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 59. 
75carrere, supra note 56, at 12. 
16Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
11wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
18Meyer v. Nebraska; 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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Farrington19 dealing with the states' authority in other areas of education shed light 
on the home instruction issue in terms of Constitutional guarantees of religious 
freedom, due process, and liberty interest. 80 
In the 1923 Meyer decision, the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska 
statute which prohibited the teaching of a modem language other than English in 
elementary schools.81 This was the first successful challenge of a state's power to 
regulate education. 
Two years later the Court, using the precedent of Meyer, decided in Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters that an Oregon statute recognizing only public education was 
ruled unconstitutional as unreasonably interfering with parents' rights.82 Pierce 
protected the property interest of the private school. 
Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court heard Farrington v. Tokushige 
which involved a Hawaii statute placing severe regulations on private schools.83 
The Justices acknowledged the right of the state to regulate private schools but held 
that such regulation cannot be so excessive as to effectively eliminate such schools 
or the purposes for which they exist. On this reasoning the Hawaii statute was 
invalidated because it unreasonably sought to "assimilate and indoctrinate a large 
alien population and to promote Americanism. "84 
79Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
8°'fobak and Zirkel, supra note 60, at 14-16. 
81Meyer v. Nebraska; 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
82Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
83Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
84rd 
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Stocklin-Enright stated in her research, "The Meyer-Pierce-Farrington 
decisions not only set limits to the state's discretionary power but also established 
that the state is a part of the parent/child educational decision."85 In Wisconsin v. 
y oder, 86 the Supreme Court applied the protection of the free exercise clause of the 
first amendment in determining that the parents' religious interests outweighed the 
state's interest in the education of high school aged Amish children. The Court was 
cautious to limit the decision to the facts of the case. The parents were convicted of 
violating the compulsory attendance statute by refusing to send their children to 
school after eighth grade. Tobak and Zirkel's summary of the decision identified 
four criteria established by the judges in making the decision in favor of the parents' 
constitutional right: 
1. The parent's interest must be religious, not philosophical. 
2. The religious interest must be long-standing and sincerely held 
3. The continued secular education would pose a real--not merely 
perceived--threat to the religious interest. 
4. The disruption in the children's education should not seriously impair 
the child's future nor threaten the public order in any significant 
way.87 
85Brendan Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education: The Role of the 
Parent, the State and the Child, 18 WILLAMITI'E LAW REVIEW 576 (1982). 
86Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
87Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 44. 
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Lotzer in his BAYLOR LAW REVIEW COMMENT discusses the need and 
ways in which to balance the interests of the state, parent, and child. 88 A 
VERMONT LAW REVIEW article summarizes the four Supreme Court cases but 
admittedly cannot find a meaningful pattern: 
Commentators may differ over the full ramifications of these 
cases, but most would agree that one principle derived from 
them is that the state has the power to compel the parent to send 
his or her child to some school, not necessarily public, and that 
the state can subject the school to reasonable regulation. The 
consensus falls apart, however, when an attempt is made to 
define "school." [T]his section will attempt to answer the central 
question: Where does parental power end and state power begin 
in education? It is assumed, and hereafter will be argued, that 
no definitive constitutional answer to this question exists at 
present.89 
Burgess prompted by the decision in Ellis v. O'Hara90 wrote of 
unconstitutionally vague statutes.91 She analyzed the statutes addressing home 
education which she found problematic in passing "constitutional muster," focusing 
particularly on requirements of teacher certification and student testing.92 
88Lotzer, supra note 29, at 417. 
89stocklin-Enright, supra note 39, at 281. 
90£llis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
91 Burgess, supra note 29, at 83. 
92Jd. at 69. 
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CONFLICT OF RIGHTS 
Lupa, professor of law at Boston University School of Law, objecting to 
the focus of most home school litigation, that of the conflict of parent rights and 
state interest, states, "This view of the matter is objectionable because it reduces 
children to pawns in a struggle between their parents and the state and thereby 
devalues children's interests, both constitutional and otherwise."93 
IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIFIC DECISIONS 
Dillahunty's, legal consul for the Ohio State Board of Education, remarks to 
the Council of State Education Attorneys in October of 1987 discussed the effect of 
a recent decision. Ohio's supreme court in the 1987 case State v. Schmidt94 
determined that the statute, accepting an approved home instruction program as an 
exemption from the compulsory attendance requirements, was not 
unconstitutionally vague.95 The approval discretion vested in the school 
superintendent was not an improper delegation of authority. Dillahunty noted that 
since the State v. Schmidt decision was given, at least three other cases on home 
schooling had been heard. She stated in her presentation that parents were lobbying 
931ra C. Lupa, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Power, 
MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW REVIEW SPECIAL CONSTITU-TIONAL ISSUE 48 (Fall 1987). 
94state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987). 
95ctaudia J. Dillahunty, attorney Ohio State Board of Education. Remarks, October 9, 
1987, Council of State Education Attorneys. 
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for guidance from the State Board of Education and for more authority in decisions 
regarding their children's education. Dillahunty indicated that Schmidt might not be 
the final word regarding home education in Ohio, but instead it might prompt the 
development of administrative rules and possibly the enactment of new legislation. 
The Special Report: Home Study96 states, "[C]ase decisions are disparate, 
frequently being decided on interpretations of state law. "97 For example, the 
seemingly incompatible decisions in Levisen,98 Grigg,99 Sal1.')'er,lOO and M.M.101 
pointed to the danger in viewing home education from a national perspective to 
make accurate generalization. The Grigg,102 Sal1.')'er103 and M.M.104 decisions did 
not consider the home instruction programs to be private schools; however, the 
Levisen court agreed with the parents that their home instruction program for their 
daughter was an appropriate exception to Illinois' compulsory attendance statutes as 
it was considered a private school. Levisen was cited but differentiated in later 
96Cheryl Karstaedt and Richard Walker, The Special Report: Home Study prepared for the 
National Association of State Boards of Education provides a short synopsis of pertinent cases and 
a bibliography for attorneys representing clients involved in home instruction litigation. 
971c1. at 7. 
98People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). 
99Grigg v. the Commonwealth of Virginia, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982). 
100/nterest of Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983). 
101State v. MM. and S.E. 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981). 
102Grigg v. the Commonwealth of Virginia 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982). 
103/nterest of Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983). 
104state v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981). 
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cases.105 The report raises the question: What if these later cases were decided 
before Levisen? Would Levisen, in reliance upon them, have then been decided 
differently? And, if so, was it right that such an important question be decided on 
the chronology of the individual court cases? 
The Special Report summarizes the concern: 
While it may seem obvious, it is important to remember that the 
home study cases, which reach the litigation stage, have as 
opposing parties, individuals and organizations who do not only 
have differing legal viewpoints but have basic philosophical 
differences. On one hand, are local or state school officials 
whose legal duty is to see that all children within the state receive 
an education. It is axiomatic that the state has an interest in an 
educated citizenry whose individuals are self-sufficient and can 
exercise their rights in a free society. To these ends, state 
legislatures enact compulsory attendance laws.106 
In these writings Mondschein and Sorenson assert: 
The states where statutes explicitly provide for home education 
or instruction have witnessed little or no litigation on the issue. 
In states which do not expressly permit instruction at home, state 
courts have been involved in determining whether home 
education would be permissible under the compulsory 
attendance statutes." 107 
105297 S.E.2d at 801. The Virginia court rejected the precedent because the Illinois 
statute lacked a comparable reference to home education as was in the Virginia statute. 
106Karstaedt. supra note 96, at 1. 
107Mondschein and Sorenson, supra note 37, at 261. 
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IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS 
Lines, a policy analyst for the United States Department of Education, 
predicts that the new wave of court cases will not be to decide whether home 
schooling should be permitted but rather to determine the extent to which states 
may regulate home instruction.108 
States adopting more permissive home school legislation have increased 
each year.109 Since 1985 Arkansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Maine, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Iowa, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming, South Carolina, Colorado, 
New York, Hawaii, Vermont, West Virginia, Missouri, Florida, Tennessee, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania have modified their laws to make them more favorable 
to home schoolers.110 On the last day of the 1988 session, the Iowa General 
Assembly established a deferred prosecution procedure for any parent who 
registered under§ 299.4 of the statute, a measure for compromise between the 
active home school lobbyist and the public education supporters. This may show 
the trend of removing certification or licensing requirements for home schoolers 
from the statutes in the remaining states.111 
108Lines, supra note 43, at 510-15. 
l®Lotzer, supra note 29, at 472; Klicka, supra note 64; EDUCATION WEEK articles May 
4, 1988, June 1, 1988, Sept 30, 1987; Lines, supra note 43, at 514. 
11 OThe revisions have been either through the home school statutes or rules and 
regulations of the state department of education. 
111 With the present deferred prosecution in Iowa, only Michigan and North Dakota 
prosecute if this certification requirement was not met 
37 
McHugh in an article in The Christian Educator provides his perception 
regarding the requirements of the home instruction laws: 
Laws that call for home schoolers to file an annual letter of 
intent, maintain simple attendance records, and teach the 
common branches of learning are truly "reasonable" because 
they do not require private schools to mimic the goals and stands 
of one of the poorest educational systems in the civilized world--
the American public schools.112 
WRITINGS SPECIFIC TO ILLINOIS 
In Illinois there is no statutory authority for home education. A 1950 
supreme court case, People v. Levisen, considers home education as a type of 
private school. The court indicates that "[T]he number of persons do not make the 
place where instruction is imparted any less or more a school, ... ,113 Levisen is 
considered to have set a precedent for Illinois as a haven for parents wishing to 
educate their children at home. 
Kotin and Aikman described the impact of the Levisen decision as the 
"[L]andmark decision in Illinois provided the fullest judicial articulation to date 
regarding home instruction as compliance with compulsory attendance laws." Their 
analysis showed that the decision elaborated on the early State v. Peterman114 
112Michael McHugh, Home Sclwol Achievement Test Requirements: Are We On the 
Right Track? THE CHRISTIAN EDUCATOR 2 (1986). 
113404 Ill. 574 (1950). 
114State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 50 (1904). 
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decision yet did not provide guidance regarding the "quality and character" required 
of home instruction.1 15 Peterman ruled that a teacher employed by the parent to 
teach his or her child all subjects taught in public schools during regular school 
hours was acceptable. 
Stronge and Moser state in their 1987 article in Illinois Principal that 
parents are required to submit a statement of assurance for parent-taught home 
instruction.116 An opinion from Illinois State Board of Education's legal 
department contradicting this states: 
There is no statutory requirement for either parent or educational 
service region superinten-dent to use the assurance statement 
form. However, the relative success of the use of the assurance 
statement will undoubtedly be evaluated on the basis of the 
extent which it is being used plus other criteria. If the 
educational service region has proof that the child is not 
receiving an education, the educational service region can, of 
course, begin truancy proceedings against the parents.117 
The concern identified in this research was that without clear cut written 
regulations or statutory authority available to school administrators and the public, 
any information was accepted as truth. 
115 KOTIN AND AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 10-14. 
116James Stronge and Mildred Moser, Home Schooling: A Trend for the Future, 
ILLINOIS PRINCIPAL 13 (May 1987). 
l l 7Letter from Sally B. Pancrazio, Manager Research and Statistics Section, Illinois 
State Board of Education, July 25, 1984. 
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A series of news articles in the fall of 1987, describing action by the 
Regional Superintendent of Cook County, heightened the confusion regarding 
home education in Illinois. The articles described the crackdown on home 
schoolers and the intent of filing for truancy because "the gray court ruling is not 
enough; that a law is needed to set down specific guidelines."118 An article in the 
Chicago Tribune describing this episode stated a legislative task force was being 
established to study the issue and possible new legislation.119 
Assistant Legal Advisor for the State Board of Education of Illinois has 
clarified the legal limits of the office of the Regional Superintendent of Schools for 
monitoring compliance with the compulsory attendance laws: 
In so doing, the regional superintendent may expect that the 
parents who seek to educate their children at home establish that 
they are providing an instruction that is at least commensurate 
with the standards of the public schools. The parents may be 
expected to document the subjects taught, which must include 
branches of learning taught in the public school, the time frame 
in which instruction will be offered, and the competency of the 
parent or other instructor(s). It is not necessary that the 
instructor have a teacher's certificate. The parents may also be 
expected to establish by written examinations or by some other 
method that the child's level of achievement is comparable to that 
of his/her peers of corresponding age and grade level.120 
118Ellen Schmid, Targeted as Truants, Daily Herald, December 6, 1987. 
119George Papajohn, Parents Put Martwick Under Fire, Chicago Tribune, Monday, 
January 25, 1988, at 1-2. 
12°R.obin Cona, legal consul, Illinois State Board of Education legal opinion in form of 
letter, December 14, 1987. 
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The home school lobby in Illinois was very strong, as was evidenced 
during the legislative session of 1987. During this session Senate Bill No. 1202121 
was introduced. The bill required that every child of school age be registered in a 
public, private, or parochial school or, in cases of home instruction, with the 
regional superintendent of schools. The lobbying interest of parents and nonpublic 
religious schools was so strong that the bill did not leave legislative committee. A 
task force compromised of public and private school representatives was 
established to study the feasibility of a pupil accounting system in lliinois. 
In 1975 policies and guidelines for registering and recognizing nonpublic 
schools in Illinois were adopted. These policies and guidelines were advisory in 
nature and to this date provide the only guidance regarding the relationship of the 
State Board of Education and the nonpublic schools. This lack of guidance forces 
public school administrators in Illinois when confronted by a child being educated 
at home or in a private school either to (1) file truancy proceedings which might 
entail lengthy and expensive litigation, (2) cooperate with the families to ensure the 
students receive a quality education, or (3) ignore the situation completely. 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE 
A historical perspective of litigation and development of statutes regarding 
home instruction was available in the literature, particularly the law review articles. 
Many authors examined litigation in individual states and related the determination 
121senate Bill No. 1202, 85th General Assemby, State of Illinois, Introduced April 10, 
1987 by Senator Maitland. 
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of the courts to the changes in the state laws regarding home instruction. Most of 
the literature looked at home instruction from a religious perspective. Very little 
was found regarding parents educating their children at home for non-religious 
reasons. 
The literature showed that the home instruction movement is not one to be 
ignored and that parents believe they should be deeply involved in the education and 
development of their children. Without the guidance of the United States Supreme 
Court, each state must establish its own standards to provide public school 
administrators with the necessary direction to fulfill their legal responsibility, which 
is meeting the attendance law requirements while acknowledging the parents' 
concern for their children's education. 
CHAPTER III 
PRESENTATION OF DATA 
There is little uniformity among the fifty states as to the legal requirements 
by which parents may educate their children at home. Although every state has a 
statute providing for compulsory education, these statutes are by no means 
uniform. Furthermore, the courts from state to state have applied these statutes 
inconsistently--even where the statutes are similar. 
It was this crazy-quilt of inconsistencies and ambiguities that prompted 
this research. Three research objectives guided this study. 
The First Research Objective was to review and analyze the compulsory 
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with 
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognized and permitted home 
instruction. Data for this analysis were gathered from several sources: 
--The statutes and regulations themselves, together with an examination of 
the legislative history in appropriate cases, 
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and 
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments 
of education as well as representatives of professional organizations. 
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The Second Research Objective was to review and analyze the relevant 
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past 
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century. 
This analysis described trends and identified those issues which were most often 
addressed by the courts' attention: 
--Inherent parental rights regarding education, 
--Interest of the state regarding education, 
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment), 
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes, (United States 
Constitution, fourteenth amendment), 
--Burden of proof, 
--Equivalency of home instruction, and 
--Qualifications of instructor. 
The cases were then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and 
regulations in the respective states to determine what, if any, legislative action 
followed the court action. 
The Third Research Objective was to trace in seven specific states, 
through further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation. 
Specific attention was directed to the political or lobbying efforts that influenced 
such legislation and to identify the most desirable elements of model legislation 
and/or administrative procedures. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE 
The First Research Objective serves the purpose of analyzing compulsory 
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with 
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognize and permit home 
instruction. 
A VENUES FOR HOME INSTRUCTION 
The fifty states are grouped into four major categories with respect to their 
particular recognition of home instruction as a permissible alternative to public 
school attendance.122 These four categories are: 
A. "Explicit Language Statute" States--States having statutes which 
explicitly permit home instruction, 
B. "Equivalency Language Statute" States--States having statutes which 
simply require attendance in public schools "or their equivalent," 
C. "Qualifies as Private School" States--States having statutes which do 
not explicitly mention home instruction, but did permit private school 
122Admittedly, such categorization runs the unavoidable risk of over-simplification. 
There are, to be sure, subcategories and "cusp" situations which will be discussed below. 
Information for these groupings is based on data obtained from surveys of state agencies as well as 
from the language of the statutes. Some overlapping of categories is inevitable. An example is 
Oregon, which is placed in the category of explicit language, where the statute referred to term 
"equivalent instruction" by a parent or tutor. The two states with rules and regulations and silent 
statutes do provide explicit requirements for home instruction; yet these rules and regulations do 
not have for this research the same political impact as statutory language provided through 
legislation. Consequently, for this research these two states are placed in the grouping of silent 
states. 
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attendance, and their courts or state boards of education construed "private 
schools" to include home instruction, and 
D. "Silent Language Statute" States--States having no statutory language 
at all beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility 
of home instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, attorney 
generals, or the state rules and regulations. 
Table I summarizes the state groupings which are used for the analysis of 
the correlation of the court cases and the laws in this objective. In addition the table 
indicates the year of the most most recent enactment or amendment to the statute. 
Between the period of 1980 until 1988, changes have been made in the statutes or 
the rules and regulations in thirty-one states. Twelve of these changes were made 
in 1987 and 1988. Twenty-six states are explicit language states with statutory 
authority for home instruction; seven states consider home instruction a form of 
private schools; twelve states consider home instruction appropriate if it is 
equivalent to public schools; and in five states there is no statutory authority or case 
law to provide for home instruction. Although the statutes in these five states are 
silent regarding home instruction or equivalency, in two of the states, rules and 
regulations have been promulgated to establish procedures to be used by the 
appropriate agency in determining if a home instruction program is an acceptable 
exemption to the specific compulsory education requirement. 123 In three of these 
states in which the statufes are silent, there is no direction from the legislature or the 
123New Hampshire, Nebraska. Other states have rules and regulations but the authority 
to develop these was specified in the statutes (i.e. Maryland and New York). 
TABLE 1 
CATEGORIES OF HOME INSTRUCTION AUTHORITY 46 
State Exolicit Lani:ual!e Private Eguivalencv Silent Year• 
Alabama y 
Alaska y 
Arizona y 1982 
Arkansas y 1987 
California y 
Colorado y lQRR 
Connecticut y 
Deleware y 
Florida y 1985 
Georgia y 1984 
Hawaii y 1988 
Idaho y 
Illinios y 
Indiana y 
Iowa y 1987 
Kansas y 
Kenruckv y 1984 
Louisana y lQRO 
Maine y 1988 
Marv land y 1987 
Massachuenes y 
Michigan y 1986 
Minnesota y 1987 
Mississinni y 1YX2 
Missouri y 1986 
Montana y 1983 
Nebraska y 1984 
Nevada y 1984 
New Hamoshire y 1984 
New Jersev y 
New Mexico y 1985 
New York y l 'JISIS 
North Carolina y 1988 
North Dakota y 
Ohio y 1976 
Oklahoma y 
Orel!. on y 1985 
Pennsvlvania y f988" 
Rhode Island y 1984 
South Carolina y 1988 
South Dakota y 
I ennesse y 1~ 
Texas y 
Utah y 1Y~7 
Vermont y 1987 
Vmmua y 1984 
Washington y 1985 
West V1rnirua y 1YX7 
Wisconsin y 1983 
Wvommg y l 'JIS~ 
Totals 26 7 12 5 
• year of most recent change 
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state board of education regarding the monitoring or requirements of home 
instruction programs.124 
For a complete understanding of home instruction requirements in each 
state, one must analyze the compulsory attendance and home instruction statutes 
enacted by the respective state legislatures as well as rules and regulations adopted 
by the state boards of education. The statutory references to these laws are 
available in the appendices of this research. 
STANDARDS FOR HOME INSTRUCTION AND COMPULSORY 
ATIENDANCE 
Authority to monitor and regulate compulsory attendance and home 
instruction varies among the fifty states. The survey verifies that at least thirty-
seven states have identified such a regulatory authority. Statutes are the source for 
this authority in thirty-three states, regulations in fifteen states, and in two other 
states the authority is from other sources such as case law. There is overlapping 
monitoring authority in twelve states. Table II summarizes the data obtained from 
the survey regarding the source and the authority used by the states to govern home 
instruction as described above. Table ill indicates that the state boards of education 
in twenty states are responsible for monitoring compulsory attendance; in ten states 
the state boards of education monitor home instruction. 
124Kansas, Alabama, Oklahoma. 
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TABLE U 
SOURCE OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
State Statute Rules Other 
Alabama 
Alaska 
" " Arizona 
" " Arkansas 
" Calltorrua 
" Colorado 
Connecticut 
JJeleware 'I 'I 
Florida 
" ueorgia 
" Hawau 
" " Idaho 
" Illinios 
" " uxuana 
Iowa 
" " Kansas 
Kentucky 
" Louisana 
" Maine 
" " Maryland ~ 
Massachuettes 
" Michigan 
" ~ 
" Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 'I 
Nebraska '/ 
Nevada 
" " New Hampsnire 
" New Jersey 
New Mexico 
" " New York 
" " North Carolina 
North Dakota 
vruo 
" UKlahoma 
vregon 'I 
" l:'ermsytvarua 
" " Rhode Island 
" " South uirolina 'l 
;:)()IJllJ LJBJ(Ola 
·1ermesse 
" Texas 
Utah 'I 
Vermont 
" Virginia 
" wasrungton 
" West Virginia 
" Wisconsin 'I 
Wyorrung 'I 
Totals 33 15 2 
TABLE III 
STATE AGENCY MONITORING 
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State Home Instruction Non-Public 
Yes No Yes No 
Alabama 
Alaska v 
" Ariwna 
" " Arkansas 
" " ( alifomia 
" " Colorado v 
" Connecticut 
Deleware v 
" Florida v 
" Geon!ia 
Hawaii 
" " Idaho v v 
I!linios v 
" Indiana 
" " Iowa 
" " Kansas 
Kentuckv 
" " Louisana 
" " Maine v 
" Marv land ' 
' Massachuettes , 
' Michi!!an 
' 
_,
Minnesota 
' ' Mississiuoi v v 
Missouri 
" " Montana 
" 
' 
Nebraska v , 
Nevada v , 
New Hamoshrre 
" 
, 
New Jersev 
New Mexico v 
" New York v v
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio v 
" Oklahoma 
Oregon ' 
" Pennsvlvania , 
" Rhode island , 
" South Carolina ' 
" South Dakota 
Tennesse 
" " Texas 
Utah 
" " Vermont 
" " Vir11inia 
' 
" Washinl!ton 
' " West Vir11inia 
' " Wisconsin 
' " Wvoming 
' 
" 
10 30 20 20 
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ELEMENTS OF HOME INSTRUCTION LAWS 
Home instruction laws in some states are limited in language and in 
requirements, yet in some states the laws are quite explicit. Table N illustrates the 
common elements of these laws derived from statutes and/or rules and regulations. 
At the time of this research, only two states require and enforce the statute that 
home instruction teachers be certified according to the specific state laws.125 
Another state, Iowa, has established a deferred prosecution procedure related to 
certification and other requirements for home instruction for the 1988-89 school 
year. In one state if the student is identified as special education, certification is 
required. Two states require a private tutor to be certified, and two other states 
including Michigan provide options to the certification requirement. In twenty-six 
states there are specific qualifications required of parents or tutors who provide 
home instruction in lieu of public school attendance. The qualification requirement 
is met by proficiency exams, high school graduation or its equivalent, or by 
undefined compen-tencies. 
In addition to certification, the other elements included in some or all of 
these statutes or regulations are: 
--required days or hours of attendance, 
--requirement to submit plans for approval, 
--declaration of intent to provide home instruction, 
--required subjects and materials, 
125Michigan, North Dakota. 
ELEMENTS OF HOME INSTRUCTION AUTHORITY 
filllll: & B c ll E f G u I I K 1. M rs: Q f Q B s I LI y CODE f{)R ELEMENT 
Alabama y y y + # y y LEA y A - File Intent 
Alaska y y y y y y y 
Arizona y y y • c y y B - Pupil Accounting 
Arkansas y y y ## y y y 
California y • y TJ:;A y y C - Submit Plan 
Colorado y y y y y y y y y y y 
Connecticut y y y y y LEA& y y y y y y D - Required Subjects 
De le ware y LEA y y 
Florida y + y LEA y y y y y E - Certification 
Geornia y y y ••# y y y y y y y *Private tutor **waived 
Hawaii y y •• y LEA y y y y #consultant## special ed 
Idaho y y LEA +options 
lllinios y y y 
Indiana y y y y y y F - Qualifications 
Iowa y y y •• y IFA y *exam **high school eq. 
Kansas y ## #options ##competent 
Kentucky y y y y lHA y y y y 
Louisana y y y y y SEA y y y y y G-#ofDays 
Maine y y y y y y IEA y y y y y y 
Arv land y y y # y y LEA y y y y y H -#of Hours 
assachuettes y y y y y y LEA y y y 
ichiPan y y •• y y LEA y y I - Materials 
innesola y y # y LEA y y y 
Mississiooi y y J - Acceptable Setting 
Missouri y y y y y y 
Montana y y y c y y y y K-Approval 
Nebraska v .. y y y y y y LEA=Local 
Nevada y y '{ y y lHA y y y y C=County 
New Hamosh1re y y y y IF.A y y y y y y S=State 
New Jersev 11-i"A y 
New Mexico y y # y y y y y L - Attendance Records 
New York y y ## y y y LEA y y y y y y 
North Carolina y •• y y y y M - Life Safety 
North Dak<>1a y y '{ '{ y y C&S y y 
Ohio y y !FA y y N - lmmunii.ation 
Oklahoma y 
Ore11.on y TFA y y y y 0 - Evaluation Plan 
Pennsvlvania y y • •• y LEA y y y y y 
Rhode Island y I fiA y y N y P - Evaluation 
South Carolina y •• y y LEA y y y y y y 
South DakOla y ## y !FA y y y Q- Proof 
Tennesse y y y y y y y y 
Texas R - Testing 
Utah y y ## y y I fiA y y 
Vennont y y y y y SEA y y y y y S - Progress Reports 
Vir~inia y y # LEA y y y 
Washin11.ton y y # y IFA y y y T - Equivalency 
West Virninia y y y c y 
Wisconsin y y y U - Due Process 
wvomin~ y y y LEA V- Rules & Regulations 
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--evaluation requirements including testing and/or progress reports, 
--availability of due process procedures, 
--fire, health, life safety requirements, 
--reporting of attendance, and 
--immunization requirements. 
Most states require some type of notification by the parents of the intent to 
teach their children at home. Reference to number of hours or days of instruction is 
indicated in the requirements of many states. Specific subjects, similar to those 
required of the public schools, are also indicated in the requirements. Some type of 
proof of student progress is also mentioned in the majority of the states. Although 
the requirements are stated in the laws of many states, the monitoring and 
enforcement authority regarding compliance is limited. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TWO 
The second research objective serves the purpose of reviewing and 
analyzing relevant judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts 
over the past twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early 
Twentieth Century. As a result of many of these decisions legislative action has 
followed. The statutes in each state are examined to identify the impact of these 
cases and the changes in the laws that have resulted. 
This examination is limited to decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court since the early Twentieth Century and other courts at the state and federal 
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level over the past twenty-five years.126 The included cases have had the most 
significant influences on state legislatures during the past ten years. Of the fifty-one 
cases researched, seven have been heard in the United States Supreme Court, eight 
in other federal courts, and the remaining thirty-six in the higher levels of the state 
courts. The holdings in these cases are included in Appendix B The cases are 
described and related to the present statutory language. 
The courts have, as the basis for their decisions, considered and balanced 
several competing positions: (1) That education is not a fundamental right provided 
by the United States Constitution, but that educating children is a legitimate state 
purpose.127 (2) That education is important in preparing students for the future.128 
(3) That a parent has a right in the choices of the child's education.129 (4) That the 
first amendment of the constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion.(5) That 
the state has an interest in developing an educated citizenry that will be self 
sufficient. BO and ( 6) That a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined131 
126The research did not attempt to analyze every case during the twenty-five year time 
frame designated, only those particularly relevant to the subject. This time frame did not apply to 
Illinois, the state on which this research--and the recommended legislation--was focused. Several 
circuit court cases were cited in the research, but were not included in the grouping that received 
more comprehensive examination. 
127san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 137 (1973). 
128Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691 (1954). 
129Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
BO Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
131pifth and fourteenth amendment of U.S. Constitution. State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 
1228 (Fla. App. 1985), State v. Newstrom 371 N.W.2d 532 (Minn. 1985). 
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Table V provides data regarding the issues of these cases. Of the twenty-
six states at the time of this research that have explicit statutory language allowing 
home instruction, thirteen have a combined total of twenty court cases construing 
the language over the past twenty-five years. These cases have been in the higher 
state courts (appellate and supreme) and in the federal court. Of these twenty cases, 
twelve were tried as criminal prosecutions and the remaining were civil cases. The 
issue of unconstitutional vagueness was considered in twelve of the twenty cases. 
In six of the cases from four of the explicit language states, the statutes were found 
to be unconstitutionally vague and in six cases from six states, the courts found that 
the statutes were not vague. 
There were eleven cases in four of the twelve states having "equivalency 
language statutes", that was, where home schooling was accepted as an exemption 
if it were equivalent to public school education. The courts found the statutes in 
three cases to be sufficiently clear, and in the remaining case the determination was 
made on other issues. Two of the cases were tried on criminal charges. 
There were nine court cases decided in the seven states grouped at the time 
of the research in the private school exemption category. None was tried in 
criminal court. Vagueness of the statute was charged in two cases and the court 
found the statute to be clearly worded and the vagueness charge unfounded. 
The issue of vagueness was not raised in any of the four cases from three 
"silent statute" states. The holdings were in favor of the state. 
As indicated in these fifty-one cases, it was difficult to make 
generalizations regarding the home instruction litigation. The cause for this was 
that the courts made decisions based on interpretations of state laws. Because of 
TABLE V 
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KEY FOR NUMERICAL REFERENCE OF ISSUES 
1. UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE--The requirement that a criminal statute be 
sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the 
behavior which is prohibited. Under this principle, a law which does not fairly 
inform a person of what is commanded or prohibited is unconstitutional as violative 
of due process. 
2. EQUIVALENCY--Same value, effect, importance and worth, but not necessarily 
the same form. 
3. PRIVAIB SCHOOL--An exemption to compulsory attendance in a school that is 
established, conducted, and primarily supported by a nongovernmental agency. 
4. BURDEN OF PROOF---In the law of evidence, the necessity or duty of 
affirmatively providing a fact or facts in a dispute on an issue raised between parties 
in a cause. 
5. QUALIFICATONS--The specific requirements for tutor or parent providing 
instruction in a home instruction program. 
6 FIRST AMENDMENT--The prohibition of states from passing laws which deny 
free exercise of religion or the provision that Congress shall make no law respecting 
establishment of religion. 
7. FIFTH AMENDMENT--The state may not deprive a person of due process or 
equal protection of the law. 
8. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT--The right provided which specifically prohibits a 
state from dening, "[T]o any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the 
laws." 
9. TESTING--The statutory requirements regarding testing. 
10. MINIMAL STANDARDS-The statutory requirements regarding minimal standards 
for instruction. 
11. APPROVAL--The authority to approve a home instruction program. 
TABLE v (can't) 
Statute STATE CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 11 
--------------------EQUIVALENT Indiana Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School 1 x x 
Iowa Johnson v. Charles City Comm. School Bd. x x x x x x 
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton no x x x x x 
State v. Trucke x x x x x 
State v. Moorhead no x x x x x 
Maine State v. McDonough x x 
New York Matter of Adam D. x x x 
Matter of Andrew "TT" x x 
Matter of Falk 
Matter of Franz Children x x x x x 
Blackwelder v. Safnauer no x x x x x x x 
---------------Count for EQUIVALENT: 
11 4 11 3 9 3 2 6 7 2 7 2 3 
EXPLICIT Arkansas Burrow v. State no x x x x 
Murphy v. State x x x x x 
Florida State v. Buckner no x x x 
State v. M.M. and S.E. x x 
F. & F. v. DuVal County x x x 
Georgia Roemhild v. State un x x x 
Minnesota State v. Budke un x x x 
State v. Newstrom un x x x x 
Missouri Ellis v. O'Hara un x x x 
In re Monnig un x x x 
State v. Davis x x x 
New Mexico State v. Edgington x x x x 
North Carolina Delconte v. State x x 
Duro v. District Attorney x x x 
Ohio State v. Schmidt no x x x x 
State v. Whisner x x 
Oregon State v. Bowman no x x x x x 
Virginia Grigg v. Commonwealth no x x x x x x x 
West Virginia State v. Riddle no x x x x x 
Wisconsin State v. Popanz un x 
--------------------Count for EXPLICIT: 
20 12 20 12 8 14 6 9 10 3 1 0 2 2 5 lJl 
"' 
Statute STATE 
PRIVATE Illinois 
-----
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
North Dakota 
Texas 
Count for PRIVATE: 
9 
SILENT Alabama 
Kansas 
7 
TABLE V (can't) 
CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 11 
-----------People v. Levisen x x x 
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education no x x x x x x 
Kentucky State Bd., Etc. v. Rudasill x x x x 
Care and Protection of Charles no x x x x x x x x 
Hanson v. Cushman x x x x x 
Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department x x x x 
State v. Patzer x x x 
State v. Shaver x x x x x x 
Howell v. State x x x x 
---------------
9 23 87 67 5 2 1 3 
Hill v. State x x x 
Interest of Sawyer x x x 
State v. Lowry x x x 
----- _N_e_b_ra_s_ka ____ S_t_at_e_E_x_R_e_l._D_o_u_.g .. la_s_v_._B_i __ g_el_o_w __________ x ____ x__ x____ x ______ _ 
Count for SILENT: 
4 3 4 0 0 3 1 3 2 0 2 0 
Count: 4 26 44 17 20 28 16 24 26 7 23 5 7 11 
Ul 
-...] 
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the diversity of statutory language, there was no clear cut precedent governing 
home instruction litigation. 
Equivalency, burden of proof, the definition of private schools, the first, 
fifth, and fourteenth amendments, minimal standards, testing requirements, 
approval procedures, and qualifications of instructors were other issues that were 
also considered in these forty-four cases as indicated in Table V. 
Before examining court cases in the states, the Supreme Court cases 
relating to compulsory public school attendance and home instruction were 
critiqued. 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 
The United States Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue 
of home instruction at the time of this research. Yet, its decisions in Pierce,132 
Yoder, 133 Meyer,134 and Farrington135 dealt with the states' authority in other areas 
of education, shed light upon the home instruction issue in terms of Constitutional 
guarantees of religious freedom, due-process and liberty interest.136 The holdings 
132Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
133Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
134Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
135Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
136James W. Tobak and Perry A.Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of Case Law. 8 
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW 14-16 (Fall 1982). 
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in Lemon, 137 Rodriguez,138 and Brownl39 established legal precedent considered in 
many of the cases concerning the propriety of home instruction. 
As early as 1920 the Court limited the power of the state to regulate 
instruction. In Meyer, the court invalidated a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching 
of foreign language to children in the early grades, the rationale being there was no 
clear danger to the state.140 This was the first successful challenge of a state's right 
to regulate education. The court then used the precedent of Meyer in deciding 
Pierce two years later. An Oregon statute recognizing only public education was 
ruled unconstitutional as unreasonably interfering with parents' rights.141 That 
decision held that the exclusive public school attendance requirement interfered with 
"[T]he liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control."142 
The Court made it clear that education was a power of the state and, at the 
same time, recognized the parents' right in decisions regarding their child's 
education. While looking at the constitutionality of the Oregon statute requiring 
public education, the Court ruled, "[T]he fourteenth amendment guaranteed 
appellees against the deprivation of property without due process of law consequent 
131Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
138san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
139Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
140Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
141268 U.S. 510, 515 (1925). 
1421ct. at 534-535. 
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upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons, present 
and prospective. "143 While protecting the parent's liberty of choice, the court also 
defended the State's authority. 
No question is raised concerning the power of the State 
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all 
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be 
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain 
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and 
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public 
welf are.144 
Shortly after Pierce, the Supreme Court heard Farrington v. Tokushige145 
which involved a Hawaii statute that placed formidable regulations on private 
schools. The Justices acknowledged the right of the state to regulate private 
schools but held that such regulation cannot be so excessive as to eliminate such 
schools or the purposes for which they exist. On this reasoning the Hawaii statute 
was invalidated because it unreasonably sought to "assimilate and indoctrinate a 
large alien population and to promote Americanism."146 The court acknowledged, 
the right of the state to regulate nonpublic schools but the effect of the regulatory 
activity could not be to eliminate them. 
I43Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534. 
145273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
I46rct. 
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Chief Justice Burger's 1972 opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder,147 applying 
the protection of the free exercise clause of the first and fourteenth amendment, 
determined that the parents' religious interests outweighed the state's interest in the 
education of high school aged Amish children. The uniqueness of this decision 
was based on: 
[A] long history as an identifiable religious sect and a successful 
and self-sufficient segment of society, the Amish have 
demonstrated sincerity of their religious beliefs, and 
interrelationship of beliefs with their mode of life, the vital role 
that beliefs and daily conduct play in continuing survival of Old 
Order Amish communities, and hazards presented by a state's 
enforcement of a compulsory education law generally valid as to 
others; beyond this, they have carried their burden of 
demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of 
continuing informal vocational education; in light of this, the 
state had to show with more particularity how its admittedly 
strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely 
affected by granting the Amish an exemption.148 
The decision was limiting in that it identified that the parents' desire to 
remove their children from public school after the eighth grade was based on strong 
religious conviction, not philosophical or personal rationale. 
The parent's constitutional interest in their children's education and 
religious instruction took precedence and overrode the children's constitutional 
147406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
1481d. at 235. 
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rights to a formal education. Later cases149 attempted to use the Amish exemption, 
citing Yoder as a precedent; yet, the majority of the courts accepted the uniqueness 
of the Amish religion and the limitations of the Supreme Court decision. 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 decided in 
1973, identified that education was not a fundamental right provided by the United 
States Constitution but that educating children was a legitimate state purpose. 
The Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman expands the 
neutrality test developed in prior cases to determine the constitutionality of statutes 
involving financial aid to nonpublic schools. This three prong test is now related to 
the facts in church/state litigation.151 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.152 
149Howell v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1986); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 
815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 
(Iowa 1985); Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct 998, 
79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984); Matter of Franz, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. 
Supp. 109, 114-115 (W.D. Mich. 1980); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. 
Riddle, 168 W. Va. 429, 285 S.E.2d 359 (1981); Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984); 
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education, 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
150411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
151KERN ALEXANDER AND M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS, 
STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS 101 (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 1984). 
152Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). 
63 
Reference to Brown v. Board of Education153 was included in this 
research to highlight the language of the decision relative to the importance of 
education in preparing students for the future and the state's interest in developing 
an educated citizenry that is self sufficient. The state's compelling interest in the 
education of its citizens was considered in numerous cases when the court was 
identifying which party had the burden of proof. 
These Court decisions have made it clear that the state and the parent both 
have a right to be part of the decision regarding a child's education but there are 
limits regarding this right. The Yoder Court summarizes this by stating, "Having a 
high responsibility for the education of its citizens, a state has the power to impose 
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." 154 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURT CASES AND RELEVANT LAWS 
While the Supreme Court established guidelines and parameters applicable 
for private and home instruction, the states, acting through the courts and 
legislatures, applied these guidelines to matters of litigation and to leglislative 
enactment 
The remaining forty-four federal and higher level state court cases were 
examined in the context of the laws of the specific state. Court cases in each state 
must be analyzed in terms of the statutory language--or absence of such language--
153347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct 686 (1954). 
I54wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
64 
in that state and, further, how that language may have been previously interpreted 
by the courts. States were grouped into four major categories with respect to their 
particular recognition of home instruction as a permissible alternative to public 
school attendance. 
A. "Explicit Language" Statute States--States having statutes which 
explicitly permit home instruction. 
B. "Equivalency Language" Statute States--States having statutes which 
simply require attendance in public schools "or their equivalent." 
C. "Qualifies as Private School" States--States having statutes which do 
not explicitly mention home instruction but do permit private school 
attendance, and their courts or state boards of education construe "private 
schools" to include home instruction. 
D. "Silent Language" Statute States--States having no statutory language 
at all beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility 
of home instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, attorney 
generals, or the state rules and regulations. 
Table I on page 46 indicates the diversity of the home instruction 
regulations for all fifty states. Significantly no state--either by statute or court 
decision--flatly disallows home instruction. Although the grouping is based on 
statutory law at the time of the research, many of the court cases analyzed were 
decided under earlier statutes which have been modified. This organization 
demonstrates trends and also helps predict how other states having statutes similar 
to the one repealed in the decision state might construe their laws. 
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"EXPLICIT LANGUAGE" STATUTE STA TES 
At the time of the research, twenty-six states had statutory wording that 
specifically allowed for home instruction.155 One might assume that such clear 
legislative mandated language would clarify the home instruction issue to the point 
where the vagaries of judicial interpretation would be unnecessary. However, 
seemingly unambiguous words--either in the statutes or in the regulations 
promulgated thereunder--were susceptible to whatever shadowy nuances that 
litigants, lawyers, and judges could read into them. 
There was great diversity in the form and the intent of these statutes. 
Even among these states considerable variance was found in the requirements for a 
home instruction program; consequently, the court decisions within these twenty-
six states followed no pattern. These states produced a total of nineteen court 
decisions within the time frame covered. The allegation of unconstitutional 
vagueness was considered eleven times. In five cases156 the statutes were found to 
be unconstitutionally vague while the language in six 157 was found to be 
sufficiently clear. 
155 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming. Statutory language that explicitly allows for home instruction was normally drafted as 
an exemption to the compulsory attendance requirements of a state. 
156Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 
(Minn. 1985); State v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985); State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750 
(Wis. 1983); Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985), In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 
(Mo. App. 1982). 
157state v. Riddle 168 W. Va. 429, 285 S.E.2d 359 (1981); State v. Bowman, 653 
P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982); State v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228 (Fla. App. 1985); State v. Schmidt, 
Test of vagueness of a statute is whether language conveys 
sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and purpose. The statute 
must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted 
by the statute.158 
66 
Stricter standards regarding vagueness are applied when criminal liability 
is charged as compared to a state that finds a parent guilty of a misdemeanor for 
non-compliance of the compulsory attendance statutes. "When the state imposes 
criminal penalties, ... citizens are constitutionally guaranteed that the offense be 
defined in the statute with sufficient clarity to permit them to understand the nature 
of the conduct prohibited. "159 These constitutional guarantees were found to be 
lacking in the Budke,160 Newstroml6l, Roemi!dl62, Ellisl63 and Popanz 164 
decisions in which criminal penalties would have been placed on the parents if the 
home instruction statutes had not been determined to be unconstitutionally vague. 
The Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, Oregon, and West Virginia statutes which also had 
29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E.2d 627 (1987); Grigg v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 224 Va. 356, 297 
S.E.2d 799 (1982); Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984). 
l58State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d at 1229 (Fla. App. 1985). See also, Reynolds v. State, 
383 S.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1980). 
159state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Minn. 1985). 
l60state v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985). 
161State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985). 
l62Roemhi/d v. State , 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983). 
163£//is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
164state v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983). 
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criminal penalties for non-compliance stood the test of clarity in Burrow, 165 
Buckner, 166 Schmidt, 167Bowman,168 and Riddle.169 
Arkansas 
As a result of the Arkansas Supreme Courtl 70 ruling that educating 
children at home did not meet the requirements for school attendance set forth in the 
compulsory attendance laws, their statutes were amended in 1985 to provide that 
parents could educate their children at home.171 Additional changes were made in 
the regular session of the Arkansas 76th General Assembly to clarify the language. 
The statutory language was explicit in terms of the requirements for parents or 
guardians desiring to educate their own children at home.172 A 1988 decision by 
the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals tested the new statutory language 
requiring the same standardized achievement tests for students taught at home as 
that given the students in public schools. It was held by the courts that this form of 
165Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984). 
166state v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228, 1229 (Fla 1985). 
167 State v. Schmidt , 29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E. 2d 627 (1987) 
168State v. Bowman, 653 P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982). 
169State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981). 
170Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441(Ark.1984). 
171Act 42, section 2, 75th General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session, Section 11, 
Emergency Clause. 
172ARK.STAT. ANN.§ 80-1503.4 -.11 (1987). 
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monitoring was "the least restrictive system to assure its goal of adequately 
educating its citizens." 173 
Florida 
Florida's statutes provides flexible provisions to allow parents to teach 
their children at home. If the parent is not certified, the parent submits to the district 
superintendent a certified teacher's evaluation of the child's progress, or the parent 
submits the result of an achievement test administered by a certified teacher. 
Prior to 1985 the Florida administrative Ccxie Rule 6A-l-951 stated that a 
private tutor must have a valid Florida teacher's certificate. Three different district 
courts of appeals in Florida, from the period of 1973 to 1985,174 dealt with the 
same basic issue of parents claiming that their tutoring at home constituted a private 
school, thus avoiding the requirements established for a private tutor. 
The rationale provided by the parents of T.A.J. and E.M.F. for not 
enrolling their children in the public school concerned race mixing. The court 
determined that the program at home did not comply with the statutory requirements 
regarding instruction by a qualified tutor, nor did it qualify as a private or 
denominational schooI.175 
173Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988). 
174F. and F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973); State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 
So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228. 
175F. and F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973). 
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Parents of M.M. and S.E., knowing that a child cannot be truant if 
attending a private school, established a private school in their home.176 The court 
stated that the legislature distinguished between private schools and home 
instruction with a qualified private tutor. The mother of the children was the tutor, 
and the home school did not fit the statutory definition of private schools; 
consequently, the court determined that the children were dependent children within 
the jurisdiction of the court, and the parents were found guilty.177 
Although the Florida statute did not at the time of the M.M.178 decision 
regulate the establishment of private schools, the court declared, "Florida parents, 
unqualified to be private tutors, cannot proclaim their home to be private schools 
and withdraw their offspring from public school."179 
The Florida decisions of the courts have been consistent. Thus, as 
recently as 1985 in State v. Buckner it was held that "The statute clearly prohibits 
an unqualified parent from teaching a child at home under the guise that a private 
school has been established "180 
Effective July 1, 1985, and subsequent to the M.M. and Buckner cases, 
the Florida legislature defined home education and established criteria for home 
education programs.181 The new language stated, "A home education program is 
I76state v. M. M. and S. E., 407 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. App 1981). 
1771d. at 991. 
178Id. 
179Jd. at 990. 
180state v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 1985). 
181FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 228.041 <:West Supp. 1988). 
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a sequentially progressive instruction of a student in his or her home by his or her 
parent or guardian in order to satisfy the requirements of §232.01."182 The 
exemptions under these statutes were clearly written to include private schools and 
home education, each with specific limitations.183 Alternate requirements were 
provided if the parent was not certified by the state agency. 
Georgia 
Georgia's compulsory attendance law was amended in 1984 to allow 
parents or guardians to teach their children in a home study program that met 
specific requirements set forth in the statutes.184 The authority for home schools 
was clearly stated: "Every parent, guardian, or other person residing within this 
state, having control or charge of any child or children between their seventh and 
sixteenth birthdays shall enroll and send such child or children to a public school, a 
private school, or a home study program. "185 Anyone found guilty of the 
misdemeanor of non-compliance with these requirements listed in the statutes was 
subject to a fine of one hundred dollars.186 Enforcement of the statute was vested 
in the local superintendent although the superintendent was not given power to 
182Jd. § 232.01 contains the compulsory school attendance language. 
183FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 228.041(34) §232.01 (West Supp. 1988). 
184GA. CODE ANN .. § 20-2-690(c)(l-8) (1987). 
1851d 
186<JA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(d) (1987). 
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require the parents to produce evidence of their compliance with the law. The only 
action the superintendent might take was to request the information and, if 
appropriate, initiate legal proceedings. 
In 1983 Terry and Vickie Roemhild, parents of three school-aged children 
in Georgia, were arrested for failing to enroll their children in either a public or 
private school as required by the state statutes. Their choice was based partly on 
religious beliefs. After researching the issue, they notified the local school and the 
state agency of their decision to provide home instruction for their children. 
Lacking the definition of private schools, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that 
Georgia's compulsory school attendance law was not sufficiently definite. "[W]e 
find OCGA § 20-2-690(A) (Code Ann. § 32-2104) fails to establish minimum 
guidelines for the exercise of such judgment, and is, therefore, unconstitutionally 
vague. "187 In making their decision, the judges made it clear that they were not 
passing judgment on the propriety of home instruction, the power of the legislature 
to exclude it, or the power of the legislature to approve it with or without 
restriction. Instead their decision focused upon the application of the "[B]asic 
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if prohibitions are 
not clearly defined "188 
The action of the court prompted the adoption of new statutory language 
in 1984, as well as supporting rules and regulations, to define private schools and 
187Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 159 (Ga. 1983). 
188rd. at 157. See also, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 294, 
298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 
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to establish the requirements for home study programs.189 With the adoption of the 
requirements contained in Private Schools and Home Study Programs,190 the 
concerns raised by the Supreme Court of Georgia were resolved. 
Minnesota 
The 1986 Minnesota legislature established a special task force, comprised 
of both public and nonpublic representatives, to develop recommendations for a 
new compulsory attendance law after a portion of the previous law was declared 
unconstitutional. One of the unique features of the legislation, passed in the 1987 
legislative session, was that if a nonpublic school or home school was recognized 
by an approved accrediting agency, the program was exempt from the statutory 
requirements except that of reporting the name, age, and address of each child 
receiving instruction.191 
During the time frame of twenty-five years designated for review in this 
research, two cases questioned the constitutionality of the Minnesota compulsory 
attendance statute. The decisions of these cases were the cause of the new 
legislation. 
Jeanne Newstrom, a Minnesota mother of two school aged children, was 
convicted in a trial court of a violation of the state's compulsory attendance law 
189GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-690 32-9914 (a) (c) (1987). 
190GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1-8 (1987). 
191.MINN. CODE ANN.§ 120.102 (4) (West 1987). 
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because she was educating her children at home and she was not a certified teacher. 
The statute required that the teacher's qualifications be "essentially equivalent" to 
the minimum standards for teachers of the same grades or subjects. The school's 
and the trial court's interpretation of "essentially equivalent" was to require 
certification although the statute was silent on the point. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the statute which imposed criminal penalties was unconstitutionally 
vague. 192 
Donald and Kathleen Budke were likewise convicted of violating 
Minnesota's compulsory school attendance law. On appeal the conviction was 
reversed because the court found that the Budke's first amendment rights had been 
infringed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the reversal, referring to the 
Newstrom decision handed down the same day.193 Having found that the 
"essentially equivalent" requirement was void for vagueness, the court never 
reached the issue of whether the statute violated the Budke's religious freedom 
protected by the first amendment. 
Following these two decisions, a temporary home school law was enacted 
requiring all home schools in Minnesota to report to their local superintendent the 
names, addresses, and ages of all children taught at home. In addition the law 
established a twelve-member task force to make recommendations to the legislature 
by February 1, 1987, for a permanent home school law. Language of the new law, 
192state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985). 
193state v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985). 
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adopted on May 21, 1987, was explicit regarding definitions and responsibilities. 
The section on compulsory instruction states: 
The parent of a child is primarily responsible for assuring that 
the child acquires knowledge and skills that are essential for 
effective citizenship.194 
The definition of "school" included public school, nonpublic, church-
related, or home instruction. If a "school" was accredited by one of the six 
recognized accrediting agencies, its only responsibility to the state was to report to 
the appropriate school district superintendent the names, addresses, and ages of the 
students. Therefore, at the time of this study in Minnesota, parents assuming the 
responsibility for their children's education have the legal right to educate them at 
home. 
Missouri 
According to the new language adopted in 1986 a "home school" was 
defined in the Missouri statutes as a school that had as its primary purpose the 
provision of private or religious-based instruction.195 The parent was required to 
maintain specified evidence that the child was receiving regular instruction. In 
addition to the description of the purpose, the language included the specific course 
requirements, the required number of hours of instruction, and the required student 
194MJNN. STAT. ANN.§ 120.101, Subdivision 1 (West 1987). 
195Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167.031(Vernon1988). 
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records. There was no monitoring procedure established to verify that the 
requirements were fulfilled. In fact, the statute stated: 
For the purpose of minimizing unnecessary investigations due to 
reports of truancy, each parent, guardian, or other person 
responsible for the child who causes his child to attend regularly 
a home school may provide within thirty days after the 
establishment of the home school and by September first 
annually thereafter to the recorder of deeds of the county where 
the child legally resides, or to the chief school officer of the 
public school district when the child legally resides, a signed, 
written declaration of enrollment stating their intent for the child 
to attend a home schooI.196 
In Missouri three cases were adjudicated, all involving different legal 
issues, but all decided in favor of the parents providing home instruction. In State 
v. Davis 197 the coun held that unless the state could prove that the parents failed to 
provide their child with proper home instruction, the criminal conviction could not 
stand. The state has the burden of proving that the parents violated the statutes and, 
since it was a criminal proceeding carrying a jail sentence and fine, the proof had to 
be beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision was based on the due-process clause 
of the United States Constitution requiring that the defendant be proved guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt of every element necessary to constitute the crime. The 
dissenting opinion reasoned that the burden of showing home instruction to be 
196Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167.042 (Vernon 1988). 
197598 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. App. 1980). 
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equivalent should fall on the parents, the rationale being that requiring the state to 
make such proof might prevent the state from enforcing the school attendance law. 
The parents appealed the decision of In re Monnig that their children were 
neglected because they failed to provide the children with an education as required 
by law.198 Although the same statute was involved, the proceedings here were 
civil, not criminal. No penalties were sought against the parents; rather, it was a 
juvenile court proceeding to determine if the children were neglected. On appeal it 
was again held that even in a civil suit the state had the entire burden of proof, i.e., 
not only that the parents failed to enroll their children in school, but also that they 
failed to provide an equivalent home instruction program. However, because no 
criminal sanctions were sought, the burden could have been met on each issue by a 
preponderance of the evidence and that it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt as 
in Davis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because in the 
juvenile court, which held against the parents, the state failed to produce evidence 
that the home instruction program provided the children was not sufficiently 
equivalent to public education.199 
The vagueness of the earlier Missouri statute was raised in Ellis v. O'Hara 
by the plaintiffs stating, "[N]either regulations nor guidelines have been 
promulgated to assist in the interpretation of this language. "200 The case began in 
the same mode as Monnig--a criminal proceeding in the juvenile court against the 
198/n re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App. 1982). 
199Jd 
200£1/is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
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parents for neglect. However, the parents brought a separate civil action seeking to 
have the compulsory attendance statute declared unconstitutional on the grounds 
that "substantially equivalent" requirement was unconstitutionally vague. The 
parents prevailed, the court holding that as the legislature provided no guidelines by 
which to measure "equivalence," nor had any rules or regulations been adopted to 
provide such a measure, "persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application. "201 Since the Missouri statute provided 
criminal penalties for educational neglect and affected the exercise of 
constitutionally protected rights, a more stringent vagueness test was held to apply. 
The court agreed with the parents and found that the parents were not given an 
adequate definition of "substantially equivalent" and that the legislature did not 
provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement. The court's determination was 
based on the facts that the statute did not comply with due process requirements and 
was unconstitutionally vague.202 Significantly the court stayed the effective date of 
the order invalidating the statute until the then current term of the Missouri 
legislature ended, thereby giving the state the opportunity to cure the vagueness 
either by statutory amendment or the promulgation of rules and regulations. In the 
interim parents were allowed to educate their children at home. A new statute with 
explicit wording was adopted and the effective date was June 19, 1986.203 
201Jd. at 380. 
2021ct. at 381. 
203Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167 031-167.071(Vernon1988). 
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New Mexico 
In 1985 the New Mexico compulsory school attendance statute was 
amended by inserting "home school" in the introductory paragraph: "Any qualified 
student and any person who because of his age is eligible to become a qualified 
student, as defined by the Public School Finance Act [22-81-1 to 22-8-42 NMSA 
1978] until attaining the age of majority shall attend a public school, a private 
school, a home school or a state institution. "204 The statute also provided the 
following definition: " 'Home school' means the operation by a parent, guardian or 
other person having custody of a school-age person of a home study program 
which provides a basic academic educational program including but not limited to 
reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies and science. "205 The 
requirements for a home school were established in NMSA 22-1-2.1. 
Prior to the 1985 amendment, the standard used by the New Mexico 
courts to review alternatives to the state's earlier compulsory attendance statute was 
"[W]hether it bears some rational relation to a legitimate state interest."206 This was 
illustrated in State v. Edgington where the higher court held that the disapproval of 
home instruction by a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child did not violate equal 
protection. Since the court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test to the statute, it 
204N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 22-12-2 A (1986). 
205N.M. STAT. ANN .. § 22-1-2 U (1986). 
206state v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 377 (N.M. App. 1983). 
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fell upon the defendant to show that the statute served "no valid governmental 
interest. "207 
North Carolina 
The General Assembly of North Carolina, in the 1987 session, ratified a 
bill to permit home instruction as a means to comply with the compulsory 
attendance statutes. Amendments in the language of the compulsory attendance 
statutes included the definition of home instruction. Additional language to 
implement the new home instruction exemption contained the qualifications for the 
instructor, testing and immunization requirements, and the waiver of sanitation and 
safety inspection. The Governor's office was named as the responsible agency for 
the collection of data regarding home instruction programs. 
Prior to 1988 North Carolina's general statutes made no provisions for 
home instruction. The statutes defined a nonpublic school as having one or more of 
the following characteristics: (1) It was accredited by the State Board of Education; 
(2) it was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools; (3) it 
was an active member of the North Carolina Association of Independent Schools; 
or (4) it received no funding from the State of North Carolina.208 In 1979 the 
North Carolina General Assembly amended the prior law by eliminating any 
reference to qualified tutors for nonpublic schools, reporting requirements and 
207Jd 
208N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-555 (1983). 
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approval of curricula. The requirements to comply with attendance, health and 
safety standards, and administering tests were included in the amended statutes, but 
the term 'school' was not defined.209 
In a 1983 U.S. Court of Appeals decision, Dura v. District Attorney, the 
parent initiated action against the district attorney in North Carolina alleging that 
their religious beliefs were infringed upon by the North Carolina compulsory 
attendance laws.210 The lower court, referring to Yoder, found there was no 
compelling state interest in preventing parents from educating their children at 
home. 2l 1 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, indicating the court's chief 
concern was for the children. The decision stated that "North Carolina has 
maintained a compelling interest in compulsory education for the children of the 
state. "212 The implications of this appellate decision was the state's interest in 
education of its citizens outweighs the religious interest of the parents' desire to 
educate their children at home. 
In 1985, in the Delconte v. State of North Carolina decision, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the 1979 amendments to permit greater latitude 
for children to be educated at home, thus upholding the parent's right to provide 
209J:ct. at 646. 
21°'712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 998, 79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984). 
211Ectward Knox Proctor, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1316 (1986). 
212712 F.2d at 99 (N.C. 1983). 
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home instruction.213 This decision was similar to Levisen214 in that the home 
instruction program provided by the Delcontes was an acceptable exemption to the 
compulsory attendance statutes. The decision was based on the fact that since the 
parent's home did not receive state funds, it was considered a nonpublic schooJ.215 
Reversing the Court of Appeals decision that the Delconte's home did not qualify as 
a nonpublic school, the higher court expressed the following interpretation of the 
legislative purpose: "Indeed, the evident purpose of these recent statutes is to 
loosen, rather than tighten, the standards for nonpublic education in North 
Carolina. It would be anomalous to hold that these recent statutes were designed to 
prohibit home instruction when the legislature obviously intended them to make it 
easier, not harder, for children to be educated in nonpublic school settings. "216 
An interesting twist to the Delconte decision involved Duro. The Delconte 
decisions at the lower court providing latitude to parental rights relied on Duro's 
lower court rulings before Duro's reversal. Fortunately the courts evaded the 
problem by calling the home a nonpublic school, thereby avoiding the constitutional 
issue, stating: 
We do not, of course, purport to decide on this constitutional 
issue. We rely, instead, on the familiar canon of statutory 
213Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (1985). 
214People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). 
215 At the time this case was heard, one of the requirements to qualify a school as 
nonpublic in North Carolina was that it receive no funding from the state. 
216329 S.E.2d. 636, 646. 
construction that (w)here one of the two reasonable 
constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the 
construction which avoids this question should be adopted.217 
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The court continues in its reference to Nova University v. Board of 
Governors: 
The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not 
destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt 
that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the 
rule is the same.218 
The justices stated that it was an issue of public policy as to whether home 
instruction should be permitted and the legislature should make the determination 
whether it would be good public policy. 
Ohio 
A parent was able to obtain an exemption from Ohio's compulsory 
attendance laws from the district superintendent when the student in question was to 
be taught by "a person qualified to teach the branches in which instruction was 
217Id. at 647. The constitutional issue was whether the statute can prohibit home 
instruction and whether the states prove it has a compelling interest in the issue. 
218Nova University v. Board of Governors, 305 N.C. 156, 287 S.E.2d 872 (1982), as 
cited in De/conte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1985). Another case dealing with home 
instruction, following this traditional approach of avoiding constitutional issues whenever 
possible, was State v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987). 
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required, and such additional branches, as the advancement and needs of the child 
may, in the opinion of such superintendent, require."219 
Although the State Board of Education in Ohio had the authority to adopt 
rules setting forth the conditions for home education, they did not do so, leaving the 
ultimate decision to the local superintendent. The Ohio statute has been in effect 
since the late 1970's and has held up to judicial scrutiny. 
Citing religious beliefs, Richard and Pamela Schmidt refused to seek the 
approval of the local superintendent to educate their daughter Sara at home. 
"Appellants claim an impermissible infringement of their religious beliefs because 
the approval requirement was not the 'least restrictive means' that Ohio could have 
employed to achieve its interest. "220 The court used the three-prong test developed 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman221 and found that the statutes did not infringe upon the right 
of the parents to exercise their religious beliefs freely.222 The court upheld as 
reasonable the Ohio statute which required approval from the local school district 
superintendent in order for a student to be excluded from the requirements of 
compulsory attendance laws. The issues of vagueness challenges and religious 
infringement were raised and rejected in this 1987 Ohio Supreme Court, "[T]hat 
219omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1985). 
220state v. Schmidt, 29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E.2d 628 (1987). 
221403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
222Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 
N.E.2d 750 (1976). The three-prong test: (1) Are the religious beliefs truly held? (2) Does the 
statutory language infringe upon the appellant's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion? 
(3) If both (1) and (2) have been satisfied by the appellant, has the state demonstrated that its 
compelling interest in the education of its citizens cannot reasonably be achieved by means that 
would impose a lesser infringement upon appellant's right to the free exercise of religion? 
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parents must seek the approval of the local superintendent for their home education 
program in order to obtain excuse from compulsory attendance laws reasonably 
furthers the state's interest in the education of its citizens and does not infringe upon 
free exercise of religion. "223 
The dissenting opinions, however, questioned giving the superintendent 
"the unbridled discretion to determine if a home-schooling teacher is qualified." The 
justices stated that the statute should be considered void for vagueness because of 
this requirement.224 The United States Supreme Court declined to review this Ohio 
Supreme Court holding, thus allowing the decision to stand, tacitly upholding the 
requirement of seeking prior approval.225 
An earlier decision found that the state's required minimum standards for 
the operation of all schools, including nonpublic schools, was an infringement on 
the first amendment free exercise of religion guarantees.226 The only reference to 
this case in Schmidt was the use of the three-prong test. These two decisions, 
made eleven years apart, indicate the confusion that may arise if the specific issues 
of the case are not considered 
223state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 631-32 (Ohio 1987). 
224state v. Schmidt, Dissenting opinions of Locher and Brogann, J. J., 505 N.E.2d 627, 
630 (Ohio 1987). 
225state v. Schmidt, Dissenting opinions of Locher and Brogann, J. J., 505 N.E.2d 627, 
630 (Ohio 1987). 
226state v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 751 (Ohio 1976). 
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Oregon 
An equivalent education by a parent or a private tutor is an acceptable 
exemption to public school attendance in Oregon: "In the following cases, children 
shall not be required to attend public full-time schools: ... Children being taught for 
a period equivalent to that required of children attending public schools by a parent 
or private teacher the courses of study usually taught in grades one through twelve 
in the public school. "227 The specific means to implement an acceptable home 
instruction program are listed in §581-21-026 of the Oregon Administrative Rules. 
Included in the rules are options for evaluating the child's progress and a 
requirement of notification to the superintendent of the intent to educate a child at 
home.228 
Oregon's statute was interpreted in State v. Bowman.229 Kay Bowman 
had applied for and received approval to teach her children at home in one Oregon 
community, but found when moving to another community within the state that the 
requirements to receive approval from the superintendent in the new community 
were more comprehensive. She continued to educate her children at home 
notwithstanding that her approval to do so was revoked. Criminal prosecution 
followed, and Mrs. Bowm:m defended herself by asserting that the exemption 
provisions were unconstitutionally vague and improperly delegated legislative 
2270R. REV. STAT.§ 339.030 (5) 339.035 (2) (3) (b) (1987). 
228581-21-026 of the Oregon Administrative Rules. 
229653 P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982). 
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power to the local superintendent. The courts disagreed and affirmed the lower 
court decision that Mrs. Bowman acted with criminal negligence. The defendant 
did not enroll or register the child in school as required and criminal prosecution 
resulted.230 
Pennsylvania 
In the closing hours of the 1988 legislative session action was taken to 
rectify the order of the federal district court in the Jeffrey231 case. The court 
declared the previous compulsory attendance language to be unconstitutionally 
vague because the statute did not define a properly qualified "private tutor." The 
court ordered that either the Secretary of Education promulgate rules and regulations 
or the legislature enact legislation remedying the vagueness of the statute. In 
addition the legislative imitative, established explicit language to govern ?ome 
instruction. Prior to the beginning of a home instruction program, the parents are to 
provide affidavits to the local superintendent assuring their intent to comply with the 
requirements of the statutes. The affidavit is to indicate that the parent or legal 
guardian is the supervisor of the program and has as a minimum a high school 
diploma. 
Although there was no higher court opinion for the time frame of this 
research, according to HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT federal civil action, similar 
230rd 
231Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, No. CV 86-1560 (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 1988.) 
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to the Jeffrey case, has been taken against approximately eleven local 
superintendents whose home policies allegedly either infringed on parents' 
constitutional rights or prohibited them from exercising those rights altogether. 232 
Prior to Jeffrey, each approval agency established its own criteria for 
determining the acceptability of such a program. As a result of Act 169,233 if the 
superintendent believes that appropriate education is not taking place, the supervisor 
of the program may be asked to provide the portfolio of the child's work and the 
evaluation. 
Virginia 
The 1984 Virginia General Assembly amended the compulsory attendance 
language in the code to provide for home instruction as an alternative to compulsory 
school attendance and expanded the choices that parents had in providing an 
acceptable home education program.234 A new section was enacted setting forth the 
requirements for such a program. Of the four alternatives presented for a home 
instruction program to be an acceptable alternative, the most liberal required that the 
parent "provides a program of study or curriculum which, in the judgment of the 
division superintendent, includes the standards of learning objectives adopted by 
232Pennsylvania Under Fire, 3:1 HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT 2 (Washington Jan.-
Feb. 1987). 
233PA. CONS. STAT.§ 13-1327.1. 
234VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-254.1 (1988). 
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the Board of Education for language arts and mathematics and provides evidence 
that the parent is able to provide an adequate education for the child." 
The preceding amended statute resulted from Grigg v. The 
Commonwealth of Virginia.235 In 1982 Robert and Vicki Grigg contended they 
had established a private school and cited People v Levisen,236 but the Virginia 
court stated, "Unlike our school attendance law, however, the Illinois statute did 
not provide for home instruction as a separate category of exemption in addition to 
attendance at a private school. "237 Thus, the court reasoned that while home 
instruction could qualify as a private school where there was no other statutory 
authority for home instruction, it could not qualify where a statute expressly 
provides for home instruction. The Griggs did not meet the qualifications for a 
tutor or a teacher prescribed in the statute. 
The Griggs also attacked the statute for vagueness. The court rejected the 
argument, stating that this attack diverted the attention of the court from the heart of 
the case; namely, the statutory language dealing with home instruction. The court 
acknowledged the interest of the parents to be sincere but legally insufficient.238 
Also since the court found the case to be civil in nature, it held that a stricter 
standard of proof than was necessary was applied at the trial court level. 
235224 Va 356, 297 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1982). 
236nie Illinois Supreme Court determined that the term "private school" in the context of 
People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950), includes home schooling if the teacher is 
competent, the required subjects are taught, and the student receives an education at least equivalent 
to public schooling. 
231Grigg v. Commonwealth of Virginia; 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799, 801-02 (1982). 
2381d. at 805. 
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West Virginia 
On July 1, 1987, the West Virginia compulsory education laws were 
amended to provide additional stipulations to the process of approval and due-
process procedures for the home instruction exemption. The statute established the 
options available to qualify to provide home instruction and the procedures required 
to evaluate student progress. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia in 1981 ruled against 
Bobby and Esther Riddle, who refused to send their children to school for religious 
reasons.239 When criminally prosecuted for failing to send their children to school, 
they claimed they had been deprived of their first and fourteenth amendment rights. 
The court pointed out the difference between this case and Yoder.240 Although the 
Riddle's religious beliefs were sincerely held, as in Yoder, an "inappropriate 
vehicle for presentation of their first amendment claim"241 was utilized. The West 
Virginia statute allowed for home education and provided for an approval process. 
The Riddles chose not to utilize the process. The court stated: "[I]t is not 
appropriate for a person entirely to disregard the statute, await criminal prosecution, 
and then assert a first amendment defense. "242 
239State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981). 
240Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
241state v. Riddle, 285 SE.2d 359, 362 (W. Va. 1981). 
2421ct. at 364. 
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Wisconsin 
In 1983 the Wisconsin statute was amended to provide that a "home-based 
private educational program," meeting specified criteria, may be substituted for 
attendance in a public or private schooI.243 The new language defines a "'[H]ome-
based private educational program' as a program of educational instruction provided 
to a child by the child's parent or guardian or by a person designated by the parent 
or guardian. An instructional program provided to more than one family unit does 
not constitute a home-based private educational program."244 
The statutory change was a result of the decision reached in State v. 
Popanz. In this 1983 decision the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
compulsory attendance statute was void for vagueness due to the lack of a definition 
of "private school."245 The earlier statute was found to be "singularly silent on 
what constitutes a private school."246 The court's opinion also stated, "In any event 
the legislature or its delegated agent should define the phrase 'private school'; 
citizens or the courts should not have to guess at its meaning. "247 Violation of 
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute is a criminal offense, and therefore strict 
standards are established for clarity. "A criminal statute must be sufficiently 
243Wis. STAT.§ 118.15 (4) (Supplement 1987). 
244Wis. STAT.§ 118.15 (Supplement 1987). 
245state v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wisc. 1983). 
246Jd. at 750. 
247Id. at 755. 
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definite to give person of ordinary intelligence who seeks to avoid its penalties fair 
notice of conduct required or prohibited. "248 
Other States249 
The remaining thirteen states with explicit statutes have had no litigation of 
substance regarding home instruction during the past twenty-five years. 
Accredited home correspondence programs are provided by the State 
Department of Education in Alaska or through the respective local districts. 250 This 
statutory provision is responsive to the unusual geography of the state. 
The requirements for approval of an exemption to compulsory attendance 
in Arizona are set forth in the Arizona statute. 25 l There is a clear distinction made in 
the definition of "home instruction" and "private school." "For the purpose of this 
paragraph, private school means a nonpublic institution other than the child's home 
where instruction is imparted "252 The requirements for home instruction are more 
explicit, including curriculum and conditions for accountability. The county school 
superintendent is given the power to approve regularly organized private schools 
and home instruction programs. 
248Jd. at 750. 
249 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina. Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming. 
250ALASKA STAT.§ 14-30.010 (1984). 
251ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-802 (B)(l) (Supp. 1987). 
252ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-802 (B)(2) (Supp. 1987). 
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Passed in April of 1988, the Colorado statute on home instruction declares 
that the choice of education is a primary right of parents and home-based education 
is a legitimate alternative to classroom instruction. " 'Nonpublic home-based 
educational program' means the sequential program of instruction for the education 
of a child which takes place in a home, which is provided by the child's parent or 
by an adult relative of the child designated by the parent, and which is not under the 
supervision and control of a school district. This educational program is not 
intended to be and does not qualify as a private and non-profit school."253 
The definition of a school in the Louisiana statutes for compulsory 
attendance purposes included the home study exemption. The language states: 
"Solely for purposes of compulsory attendance in a nonpublic school, a child who 
participates in a home study program approved by the Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education shall be considered in attendance at a day school; a home 
study program shall be approved if it offers a sustained curriculum of quality at 
least equal to that offered by public schools at the same grade level. "254 
Legitimate home instruction programs in Mississippi are "[T]hose not 
operated or instituted for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory 
attendance law."255 
The definition of a "home school" in the Montana statutes is simply stated 
as the instruction by a parent of his child, stepchild, or ward in his residence.256 To 
253coLO. REV. STAT. Section 1Article33 tit. 22 22-33-104.5 (Supp. 1987). 
254LA. REV. STAT. Ann.§ 17-236 (West Supp. 1982). 
255Miss. CODE ANN.§ 37-13-91(20)(i) (Supp. 1987). 
256MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-5-102 (1985). 
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qualify in Montana for exemption from compulsory attendance, a home school must 
notify the county superintendent of schools of their intent. 257 
The school committee in a Rhode Island community where a child resides 
had the authority to approve a course of "at-home instruction." The requirements 
set forth in the Rhode Island statutes are the same for a private school as they are 
for a program of instruction provided at home. Any decisions made by the school 
committee may be appealed to the State Board ofEducation.258 
The South Carolina school board in the district where the student resides 
has the authority to approve a home instruction program, provided the requirements 
for approval are met.259 This explicit language is a result of the 1988 South 
Carolina legislature amending the 1976 statutes. 
In Tennessee a home school that is associated with an organization that 
conducts church-related schools is exempt from the requirements of the section of 
the statutes on home schools.260 Other "home schools" must provide notice to the 
local superintendent and fulfill other specified requirements.261 
The Utah Code stipulates that : 
[O]n an annual basis, a minor may receive a full release from 
attending a public, regularly established private, or part-time 
257MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-5-109 (5) (1985). 
258R.J. GEN. LAWS§ 16-19-1(Supp.1987). 
259s.c. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (Law Co-op 1988). 
26°'J'ENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-6-3050 (a) (2) (Supp. 1987). 
261rd 
school or class if: ... the minor is taught at home in the 
branches prescribed by law for the same length of time as 
minors are required by law to be taught in district schools.262 
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The local board is charged with the responsibility of approving home 
instruction programs and making every effort to resolve attendance problems.263 
A home study program is defined in the Vermont statutes as "[A]n 
educational program offered through home study which provides a minimum 
f d 11 264 course o stu y . . . An approved program of home instruction is an 
exemption to the compulsory attendance laws.265 The law specifies the particular 
information that must be provided with the enrollment notice to the State 
Department of Education. A child must be enrolled in a public or private school 
until the home study program is approved by the State Board or its designee.266 
The requirements for the exemption of home instruction in Washington 
are explicitly stated as "Instruction shall be home-based if it consists of planned and 
supervised instructional and related educational activities, including a curriculum 
and instruction in the basic skills of occupational education, science, mathematics, 
language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, and the 
development of an appreciation of art and music, provided for a number of hours 
equivalent to the total annual program hours per grade level established for 
262UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53-24-1.3 (b) (ii) (Supp. 1987). 
263Jnformal Opinion No. 83-20, Attorney General Utah, June 8, 1983. Local School 
Board Authority Regarding Home Instruction, at 13. 
264vT. STAT. ANN. tit 16 § 1 16 11 (21) (Supp. 1987). 
265vT. STAT. ANN. tit 16 § 1121 (2) (Supp. 1987). 
266vT. STAT. ANN .. tit 16 § 166b (Supp. 1987). 
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approved private schools under RCW §§ 28A.02.201and28A.02.240 ... "267 The 
parents instructing their children are to be supervised by a certified person. 268 The 
statute clearly indicated that the parents "shall be subject only to those minimum 
state laws and regulations which are necessary to insure that a sufficient basic 
educational opportunity is provided to the children receiving such instruction."269 
Wyoming statutes have been amended(1985) to add language referring to 
home instruction. 
A home-based educational program means a program of 
educational instruction provided to a child by the child's parents 
or legal guardian or by a person designated by the parent or legal 
guardian. An instructional program provided to more than one 
family unit does not constitute a home-based educational 
program. "270 
The curriculum requirements provide that there is no requrement to 
include any material that is in conflict with religious doctrimes. "Basic academic 
educational program is one that provides a sequentially progressive curriculum of 
fundemental instruction in reading, writing, mathematics, civics, history, literature 
and science. "271 The home-based educational program must be submitted to the 
267WASH. REV. CODE§ 28A.27.010 (4) (Supp. 1987). 
268Jd 
269WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.27.320 (Supp. 1987). 
270wYo. STAT.§ 21-4-101 (v) (1985). 
271WYO. STAT.§ 21-4-101 (vi) (1985). 
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local district each year to show that it is in compliance with the requirements of the 
statute. 272 
SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES FOR "EXPLICIT LANGUAGE" 
STATES 
Reviewing the cases in states that currently have explicit language 
allowing home instruction demonstrated the difficulty of predicting the results of the 
specific cases in the state or federal courts. However, there was clearly a trend for 
courts and legislatures to extend more tolerance for parents wishing to educate their 
children at home. Wisconsin, Georgia, Missouri, Pennsylvania and Minnesota 
courts found the statutes of their states void for vagueness. Georgia passed a new 
home school law in 1984 after the 1982 Roemhilcf273 decision in which the state's 
compulsory attendance statute was struck down as "impermissibly vague" and in 
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 1981 
Popanz274 decision was followed by the passage of explicit home school legislation 
in Wisconsin. The lack of definition of "private school" caused the court to find the 
prior Wisconsin statute to be void for vagueness. In 1985 the legislatures in 
Minnesota and Missouri passed explicit legislation following the "void for 
vagueness" decisions in Newstrom,275 Budke,276 and Ellis.277 New Mexico's 
272wyo, STAT.§ 21-4-102 (b) (1985). 
273Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983) 
274state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985). 
275state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985). 
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home school requirements became effective in 1985, following the 1983 
Edgington278 decision against the parents. The Jeffrey279 court set aside the 
previous statute because its vagueness. The legislature in the closing hours of the 
1988 session established very specific language governing home instruction. West 
Virginia passed new home school laws in 1987 as a result of lobbying efforts, not 
to correct any decisions by the courts. Ohio has protected its current statutory 
language that was found reasonable and upheld in the Schmidt 280case. The courts 
in North Carolina agreed that home instruction was a form of private school 
because of the definition of nonpublic schools in the statutes. The justices agreed 
that it was the responsibility of the legislature to determine if home instruction was 
good public policy. The legislators in North Carolina accepted the direction of the 
courts and adopted explicit language legislation after the Delconte281 and Duro282 
decisions. 
These decisions indicate that the courts have been reluctant to evaluate 
home instruction and are willing to act only upon the compliance with the present 
277El/is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 
278state v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 375, 377 (N.M. App. 1983). 
279Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, No. CV-86-1560 (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 24, 1988). 
280state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987). 
281Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636, (N.C. 1985). 
282Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 998, 
79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984). 
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laws. The legislature in numerous states has taken action to clarify the standards as 
a result of such decisions. 
The explicit language in the other states in this group was quite varied. 
States such as Minnesota, Virginia, Colorado, and Louisiana indicate only that 
home instruction was an exemption from the compulsory attendance requirement, 
and in other statutes the language included details regarding the specific 
requirements for a program to be an acceptable alternative to public schools.283 The 
other major difference between the states was the approval process. In Utah the 
local school board or its designee had that authority of approval. In Vermont the 
process was directed to the State Board of Education; and in Georgia there was no 
language indicating who was responsible for the approval process. In Montana 
only notification to the proper authority was required. The varied language and 
requirements of the statutes in this grouping of states had no rational basis. 
"EQUIV ALENCY LANGUAGE" STATUTE STATES 
Equivalent instruction language was included in the statutes of twelve 
states.284 The implication in these states was that home instruction was an 
acceptable alternative to the required attendance in public schools if the program 
was equivalent. Parents and school administrators were confronted with the 
283 An example of this is Missouri. 
284connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, South Dakota. 
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problem of knowing and agreeing upon the criteria that should be utilized to 
determine equivalency. 
Connecticut 
Parents of children over seven and under sixteen were required by the 
Connecticut General Statutes to cause these children "[T]o attend a public school 
regularly or to show that the child is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in 
the studies taught in public schools. "285 The State Board of Education adopted a 
policy in 1976 which states "[W]hen a parent wishes to educate a child at home, the 
board of education of the district in which the child resides will determine whether 
the instruction is equivalent to that offered by the public schools, and the Secretary 
of the State Board of Education will review and approve the decision." The State 
Board developed suggested procedures to assist and direct local boards and 
parents. 286 
No higher level court decision was identified in Connecticut during this 
research's designated time frame of twenty-five years. State v. Corcoran281 was 
mentioned to identify the direction taken in lower courts in matters such as this. 
The Superior Court case was heard in 1982 as a result of parents, members of the 
285coNN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1986). 
286connecticut State Department of Education, Suggested Procedures Concerning 
Requests from Parents to Educate Their Child at Home, August 24, 1982. 
287 State v. Corcoran, CRlS-068413 Superior Court, G.A.15 Hartford/New Britain, 
Conn. (April 27, 1982). 
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Seventh Day Adventist faith, who applied for permission to educate their son Noah 
at home. The parents felt that their sincerely held religious belief would be violated 
if they were to enroll Noah in public school. The judge stated that the parties were 
in conflict over a philosophical principal and that further criminal sanctions were 
unlikely to deter future reoccurrences. His recommendation was to decriminalize 
the proceedings and for the defendants to be given an opportunity to disprove the 
Board's charge that they were not providing an equivalent education to their son, 
Noah. 
Indiana 
Indiana law required parents to provide an education equivalent to that 
given in public schools.288 Failure to do so was a class B misdemeanor. In 
Indiana a 1984 memorandum from the prosecuting attorney defined the term 
"equivalent instruction." The intent of this definition was to clarify for the staff of 
the prosecuting attorney's office what should constitute compliance with the 
compulsory attendance statute. 
Instruction is 'equivalent' to public school instruction and 
therefore constitutes compliance with the Indiana compulsory 
attendance statute when it is provided as part of a written 
instructional plan which includes: 
2881ND. CODE ANN. §20-8.1-3-34 (West 1987). 
1. Student performance objectives including development of 
reading, writing and computation skills; 
2. The method to achieve the performance objectives; 
101 
3. The time period ( 1 calendar year or less) in which the performance 
objectives are to be accomplished and a schedule for achieving each 
objective; 
4. The method of evaluation to be utilized to determine progress toward 
the objectives and to summarize and periodically report the results of 
the evaluation; · 
5. The adult responsible for discipline and super-vision of the children 
and achievement of each instructional objective; and 
6. The instruction is provided in a school day of reasonable length and 
results in significant progress toward the performance objectives 
stated.289 
The Indiana Supreme Court State v. Peterman had, in 1904, ruled that a 
teacher employed by the parent to teach their child all subjects taught in public 
schools during regular school hours was acceptable. "We do not think that the 
number of persons, whether one or many, make a place where instruction is 
imparted any less or more a schooI."290 A more recent decision in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Indiana found that plaintiffs home education 
program was sufficient to constitute instruction equivalent to that given in the public 
schools.291 
289steven Goldsmith, Memorandum from the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney of 
Marion County Indiana. February 17, 1984. 
290State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550, 551 (1904). 
291Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp. 798 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Evidence was produced that the original prosecution of the Mazmiecs was because they continued to 
frustrate state officials in gathering evidence of the equivalency of the program, not that they were 
incapable of meeting the requirements of the law. At the time of the litigation, the children were 
being educated in Illinois for reasons apart from the case. 
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Iowa 
Equivalent instruction standards were defined in the Iowa statutes.292 The 
purpose of these standards was, "[T]o give guidance to parents, guardians, local 
school boards, and teachers providing private instruction outside the traditional 
school setting with respect to equivalent instruction for children of compulsory 
school age."293 The controversial standard was the requirement of the equivalent 
instruction being provided by a certified instructor. 
The Iowa Supreme Court in 1981 found that use of the terms "equivalent 
instruction" and "certified teacher" did not render the Iowa compulsory attendance 
statute unconstitutionally vague.294 Finding the other issues presented by the 
defendants without merit, the court went on to affirm that Norman and Linda 
Moorhead were guilty of a misdemeanor for violating the law since neither of the 
Moorheads were certified teachers. 
In a 1987 supreme court decision, State v. Trucke,295 reference was made 
to precedent set forth in two cases,296 which held the undefined term "equivalent 
instruction" unconstitutionally vague when applied to persons who seek to operate a 
2921ow A CODE ANN. § 299 (West 1988). 
2931d. 
294state v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981). 
295state v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987). 
296Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. 
Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1985). 
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religious school for their own and other people's children. Fellowship was 
remanded to District Court, where the court held that the statute was no longer 
unconstitutionally vague as the state regulations were amended to define "equivalent 
instruction. "297 Iowa promulgated regulations entitled "Equivalent Instruction 
Standards," which became effective in 1986. The purpose of the standards was "to 
give guidance to parents, guardians, local school boards, and teachers providing 
private instruction outside the traditional school setting with respect to equivalent 
instruction for children of compulsory school age. "298 The certification requirement 
for the instructor was still included in the law. In the spring of 1988 the legislative 
session placed a moratorium for one year on any action against parents educating 
their children at home if they fulfilled the registration requirement. 
Maine 
One acceptable alternative to attendance at a public day school was "(1) .. 
if the person obtains equivalent instruction in a private school or in any other 
manner arranged for by the school board and if the equivalent instruction is 
approved by the commissioner."299 Effective November 1, 1988, the Rules for 
Equivalent Instruction Through Home Instruction defined the approval procedures 
291Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 678 F.Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.Iowa 1988). 
298Equivalent Instruction Standards, Chapter 63, at 1. 
299ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 5001-A 3. A (1) (1987). 
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for home instruction programs that would fulfill the equivalency requirement of the 
statutes. 
In State v. McDonough, 300 the parents claimed the denial of their 
guaranteed fourteenth amendment rights provided by the United States Constitution 
as the basis in defense of their civil statutory violation of the compulsory attendance 
statutes in Maine. The Maine statute provided that home education was the 
equivalent instruction if approved by the commissioner and if denied, an appeal 
process was available. The court's defense of the state's position asserted: 
In short, where the state has provided a reasonable procedure 
whereby the defendants may vindicate their asserted right to 
educate their children at home, they may not ignore that 
procedure and then appeal to this court claiming that their right 
has been denied.301 
New York 
The Regulations supporting the statute governing instruction in New York 
were amended July 1988. Prior to this, guidelines had been prepared by the state 
educational agency to assist public school officials and parents to recognize what 
constitutes equivalent instruction in New York.302 The amended regulations were 
more specific in establishing procedures to assist school authorities in fulfilling their 
300srate v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977 (Me. 1983). 
3011d. at 980. 
302Joan Arnold, Guidelines on Home Instruction, September 1985. 
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responsibility under statute. The local superintendent, acting as an agent for the 
school board, generally evaluated the equivalency of a program to decide if it was a 
legitimate exception to the compulsory attendance requirements.303 
If parents did not receive approval of the local superintendent or the 
school board, there was an appeal process established. During the appeal period 
the parents were required to send their children to public school. If parents refused 
to send their children to school when their home instruction program was not 
approved, the public school authorities could refer the matter to family court as a 
matter of educational neglect on the part of the parents.304 
At least five major court cases in such child protective proceedings have 
been heard in New York during the twenty-five year period designated for this 
research. 305 In one case the appellant, Barbara Franz, removed her three children 
from school and was convicted of neglect in the Family Court, Queens County, 
New York. Mrs. Franz pleaded that the compulsory features of the Education Law 
were unconstitutional and impinged upon the fundamental guarantee of privacy. 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division upheld the conviction.306 The court held 
303N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 3204 (1986). Instruction given to a minor elsewhere than at a 
public school shall be at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given to minors of like 
age and attainments at the public schools of the city or district where the minor resides. The local 
board of education has the responsibility under law to assure that every pupil in its district is 
provided with an appropriate educational program that is substantially equivalent to that provided 
in the public schools of the district of residence. 
3041d 
305Matter of Adam D., 505 N.Y.S.2d 809 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986); Matter of Falk, 110 
Misc. 2d 104, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1981); Matter of Lash, 92 Misc. 2d 643, 401 N.Y.S.2d 124 
(1977); Matter of Franz, 55 A.D.2d 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 
F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
306Matter of Franz, 390 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1977). 
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the statutory requirements that minors attend public school was constitutional and it 
was appropriate to determine what was a permissible replacement for public school 
education. 
The child protection proceedings regarding Adam D. were to determine 
"[W]hat, if any, Family Court intervention is necessary to enable the State in 
carrying out its role as parens patriae to insure that Adam D. receives an adequate 
instruction?"307 Adam D.'s educational best interest was the focus of the hearing. 
When Adam was interviewed, he stated that he didn't mind learning at home, but he 
thought he might prefer going to school with friends.308 The court found that 
Adam's best educational interest required that he be placed under the supervision of 
the court. The terms and conditions of the supervision were listed in the opinion. 
These two cases point out the court's reluctance to define "substantially 
equivalent." That evaluation belongs to those with the "expertise to evaluate the 
teacher, the curriculum, and the student--through standardized testing. "309 
In Blackwelder v. Safnauer evidence was presented that the parents 
refused on site visits of the home instruction program they were providing their 
307Matter of Adam D., 505 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1986). 
308supreme Court Justice Douglas in Wisconsin v. Yoder. in his dissenting opinion, 
expressed concern for the rights of students regarding decisions on education. Also see Debra 
Mc Vicker, The Interest of the Child in the Home Eduction Question: Wisconsin v. Yoder Re-
examined, 17 INDIANA LAW REV. 728 (Summer 1985), focused on a child being deprived of the 
standard the state legislature has deemed necessary for a quality education. 
309Matter of Adam D., 1986, 505 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986). It should 
be noted that standardized testing was not required under the 1985 guidelines, only that the parent 
should submit a plan for evaluation of the pupil's progress. The 1988 amended Regulations 
requires an annual assessment to include the results of a commercially published norm-referenced 
achievement test 
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children.3 10 The parents' claims regarding privacy, due-process, and the 
establishment clause were unfounded and the statute and regulations were found not 
to be vague. the day after the judgement was entered , the New York Board of 
Regents adopted regulations to implement§ 3204.311 Prior to the adoption of these 
regulations, local schol districts implemented § 3204 using advisory guidelines 
issued by the state Education Department which were developed in 1985. Appeals 
made to the District Court and to the U.S. Appealate Court were rejected.312 
Other States 
Nevada provides specific exemptions from compulsory attendance if the 
child receives equivalent instruction. Although the statutory language does not use 
the terms "home instruction" or "home education," it does require that the parents 
instructing their child at home be qualified for a teaching certificate for the grade 
level to be taught or the parents should consult with a person who possesses a 
teaching certificate.313 The term "consultation" is clarified in the statute. In 
addition the language indicates what should be included in the request for a child to 
31DB/ackwe/der v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) 
3118 A N.Y.C.R.R. 100.10 
312s/ackwe/der v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), motion for 
reconsideration denied, August 15, 1988: U.S.C. OF Appeals for Second Circuit, dismissed Jan. 
23, 1989. 
313NEV. REV. STAT.§ 392.015 (2) (Michie 1980). 
108 
be excused from compulsory attendance on the "[G]rounds that the child will be 
given equivalent instruction outside the school. ... "314 
One of the six exceptions to Hawaii's compulsory attendance 
requirements is, "Where the child is enrolled in an appropriate alternative 
educational program as approved by the superintendent in accordance with the plans 
and policies of the department of education."3 15 The policies and plans of the 
Department of Education are set forth in the form of regulations. The State Board 
of Education amended the regulations in July of 1988. The new regulation defines 
home schooling, listed the educational objectives and subjects that are to be 
addressed, and also lists the testing and reporting requirements. These regulations 
are less stringent than the previous ones in that there is no longer an educational 
qualification for parents who are educating their own children at home.316 
Idaho's statute is mute regarding home instruction. Parents are to cause 
their children to be instructed in subjects commonly taught in the public schools in 
the state of Idaho. The only additional language that provides any guidance states: 
Unless the child is otherwise comparably instructed, as may be 
determined by the board of trustees of the school district in 
which the child resides, the parent or guardian shall cause the 
child to attend a public, private or parochial school during a 
314NEV. REV. STAT.§ 392.025 (1) (Michie 1980). 
315HAw. REV. STAT.§ 298-9 (6) (1985). 
316Hawaii Compulsory Attendance Exception, Regulations, 4140.1.1(July1988). 
period in each year equal to that in which the public schools are 
in session ... 317 
In Delaware, the compulsory attendance requirement does not apply: 
[I]f it can be shown, and witnessed by written endorsement, to 
the satisfaction of the superintendent of the school districts, to 
the satisfaction of an official designated by the State Board of 
Education, and by a written examination, that a child is 
elsewhere receiving regular and thorough instruction in the 
subjects prescribed for the public schools of the State, in a 
manner suitable to children of the same age and stage of 
advancement.318 
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The local school district has the authority to monitor and regulate home 
instruction according to the requirements of the statutes. 
General regulations for home instruction are promulgated under the 
authority of the Education Article of the State of Maryland in July of 1987.319 The 
new Bylaw eliminates the requirement that anyone teaching at home either be 
certified by the state or be a college graduate with expertise in teaching. 
The goal for educating public school students in New Jersey is to provide 
them with a "thorough and efficient" education. Students receiving an education in 
a setting other than public schools are to receive instruction equivalent to that 
provided in public schools for children of the similar grades. Parents bear the 
burden of introducing evidence that there is compliance with the equivalency 
317IDAHO CODE§ 33-202 (1981). 
318oEL. CODE ANN. tit 14, § 2703 (a) (Supp. 1986). 
319Bylaw Comar 13A. 10.01-05 (1987). 
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language, but the ultimate burden of proving lack of equivalency rests with the state 
or local district. 320 
The South Dakota statutes excuse children from compulsory attendance if 
"[P]rovided with competent alternative instruction for an equivalent period of time 
as in public schools." The State Board of Education has promulgated regulations to 
support the statutory language. 
SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES IN STA TES WTIH "EOUN ALENCY 
LANGUAGE" 
The courts in New York are reluctant to define "equivalency"; yet they do 
not find the statute and the state regulations to be unconstitutionally vague. The 
legal and political issues in Iowa at the time of this research involve the issue of 
certification, not equivalency. Indiana has guidance from the prosecuting attorney 
as to the interpretation of equivalency that will be used at the judicial level. Maine's 
equivalency statute has been upheld in court as a reasonable procedure. New 
Jersey and Delaware use the terms "thorough and efficient" education for all 
schools. This research considered states with the "thorough and efficient" 
language in the equivalent grouping. 
The phrase "equivalent elsewhere" provides latitude as well as confusion 
to many parents and school administrators. The questions that continue to be raised 
are who and what determines and/or approves the equivalency and what are the 
320state of New Jersey, Department of Education, Commonly Asked Questions Relating 
to Home Schooling, March 10, 1982. 
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due-process provisions to question the approval or lack of same. States such as 
Hawaii, New York, and Maine have promulgated regulations or guidelines to 
govern the approval authority in the determination that a student is receiving an 
equivalent education as required by the statute. 
HOME INSTRUCTION QUALIFIES AS A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Court interpretation, language in the statutes, and general practice have 
allowed home instruction to qualify as a private school, thereby falling within that 
exemption to the compulsory attendance laws.321 Webster's New World Dictionary 
defines "private" as not open to, or controlled by, the public.322 Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters,323 protects the property interest of the private school. The 1925 
Supreme Court ruling holds that the Oregon statute requiring public school 
attendance interferes with the parents' liberty to bring up their children as provided 
by the fourteenth amendment. Pertinent court cases referring to private schools as 
well as home instruction are included in this analysis of private school states. 
321nlinois, Michigan, California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Texas. 
322oAVID B. GURALNIK, Editor, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE 
AMERICAN LANGUAGE 453 (New York: Popular Library 1973). 
323268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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California 
In California there have been no identifiable court cases during the twenty-
five years designated for this study. Home schooling is not specifically addressed 
in the California statutes. A memo from the California State Department of 
Education identifies three options which are available to parents who wanted to 
teach their children at home. 324 
One alternative available to parents is to enroll the students in a private 
school. The law does not establish minimum standards for private schools, 
requiring only that private schools file a Private School Affidavit with the State 
Department of Education. 325 Private tutoring by a certified teacher or Independent 
Study through the public school are the other two options.326 
lliinois 
There is no statutory language in lliinois regarding home instruction. One 
exemption, to the compulsory attendance statute provides: 
Any child attending a private or parochial school where children 
are taught the branches of education taught to children of 
corresponding age and grade in the public schools, and where 
324L. Fred Femandex, Non-Public Schools Unit, California State Department of 
Education, undated memo. 
325CALIFORNIAEDUCATIONCODE § 48222 (1987). 
326CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE§ 48224 (1987). 
the instruction of the child in the branches of education is in the 
English language.327 
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A 1950 Illinois supreme court decision People v. Levisen,328 established 
the precedent in the state to allow parents to educate their children at home. The 
Levisen's home school was considered by the supreme court to be a private school. 
A mother with strong religious convictions taught the same subjects at 
home to her third grade daughter as were taught in the public school. The 
stipulations accepted by all included the child had regular hours for study and five 
hours of instruction. In addition it was stipulated that she showed proficiency 
comparable with an average third grade student. Mrs. Levisen and her husband 
believed their child should not be educated in competition with other children. They 
argued: 
[A] school, in the ordinary meaning of the word, is a place 
where instruction is imparted to the young, that the number of 
persons being taught does not determine whether the place is a 
school, and that by receiving instruction in her home in the 
manner shown by the evidence the child was attending a private 
schooI.329 
The Illinois Supreme Court in 1950 ruled in Levisen that the "[O]bject of 
section 26-1 of the School Code, requiring children to attend school, is that all 
327m. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 § 26-1 (1987). 
328404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). This case did not occur in the twenty-five year 
time frame established for this research. It was included because of the precedent it established in 
Illinois. Moreover, it was a case often used by parents in other states to establish their homes as 
private schools. 
3291d. at 576-77. 
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children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular manner 
or place. "330 The court placed the burden upon the parents by stating: 
Those who prefer this method as a substitute for attendance at 
the public school have the burden of showing that they have in 
good faith provided an adequate course of instruction in the 
prescribed branches of learning. No parent can be said to have a 
right to deprive his child of educational advantages at least 
commensurate with the standards prescribed for the public 
schools, and any failure to provide such benefits is a matter of 
great concern to the courts.331 
The Levisen court held that the parents sustained their burden by proving 
that their home instruction was adequate to qualify as a private school. Having thus 
found that the parents were not in violation of the Illinois compulsory attendance 
law, it was unnecessary for the court to consider their secondary argument that the 
statute was unconstitutional. 
In a more recent case, Scoma v. Chi.cago Board of Education,332 a federal 
court was directly confronted with the question of whether the Illinois compulsory 
attendance law was unconstitutional. In Scoma the parents contended that the 
statute abridged their constitutional right to educate their children "as they see fit" 
and "in accordance with their determination of what best serves the family's interest 
and welfare." The parents sought pre-approval for their program, but the court 
3301d. at 577. 
331 Id. at 578. 
332391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
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found there was no precedence for such approval. The court observed that the 
Yoder decision, cited by the parents, did not apply because Yoder involved a claim 
of religious freedom. The Scomas were not asserting a religious right but only "a 
personal or philosophical choice" which was not within the bounds of 
Constitutional protection. "Thus the state need not demonstrate a 'compelling 
interest'; it must act only 'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school. "333 
Since the state met this lesser burden, the court held the Illinois compulsory 
attendance law to be constitutional as applied to the Scomas.334 The court, referring 
to Levisen, emphasized that the burden of proof rest with the parent to show that a 
plan of home instruction qualifies as a private school. 
Scoma and Levisen have been quoted in legal settings throughout the 
country. In many courts the justices have rejected the reference, as the language in 
the statutes in other states was not comparable nor were the stipulations in the case. 
Kentucky 
There is no language in the Kentucky statutes referring to home 
instruction. The exemptions to public school attendance includes private schools. 
As a result of the 1984 amendments to the Revised Statutes, the Department of 
Education is no longer authorized by statute to approve private, parochial, or church 
schools. 
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In Kentucky the board of education of the district in which the child 
resides has the authority to exempt from attendance every child of compulsory 
attendance age "who is enrolled in regular attendance in a private, parochial, or 
church regular day school. "335 
The court in Kentucky State Bd. Etc. v. Rudasiif336 has held that the state 
may not require a teacher in a nonpublic school to be certified under statute. The 
case also states that no parent may be compelled to send his/her child to any school 
to which he/she may be conscientiously opposed. "If the legislature wishes to 
monitor work of private and parochial schools in accomplishing the constitutional 
purpose of compulsory education, it may do so by an appropriate standardized 
achievement testing program. "337 
Massachusetts 
The compulsory attendance statute of Massachusetts delegates school 
committees in local communities to approve private schools.338 The advisory 
opinion of the Department of Education legal counsel interprets the statute to allow 
for home education if the local official approved of the program.339 
335KY. REV. STAT. §159.30(b) (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1987). 
336589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979). 
3371d 
338MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24. 
339Massachusetts Department of Education, Memorandum of the Department of 
Education General Counsel Re: Advisory Opinion on Home Eduction, January 4, 1980. 
117 
An unpublished opinion in Perchemildes v. Frizz/e340 has been cited 
nationally as a case in which the court established criteria to determine if a home 
education program was equivalent to the public school. The case produced a great 
deal of publicity, yet "its judicial acceptance has been markedly limited. "341 A more 
recent opinion, Care and Protection of Charles,342 condoned home education if the 
program were approved locally. The court validated the constitutionality of the 
statute and remanded the case to the lower court for the judge to assist the parties to 
come to agreement regarding Charles' educational program. Both the lower court 
and the Supreme Judicial Court found Charles to be in need of care and protection. 
The Supreme Judicial Court provided the following direction: "However, because 
we remand this case to the lower court, we off er some guidance on the extent to 
which approval of a home school proposal may be conditioned on certain 
requirement without infringing on the liberty interests of the parents under the 
fourteenth amendment. "343 The decision provided direction regarding curriculum, 
length of program, competency of the parent to teach their children, subject matter, 
and processes to evaluate the progress of the children. 
340Perchemlides v. Frizzle Civil No. 16641 (Hampshire Superior Court, Mass. Nov. 
13, 1978). 
341 Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 136, at 27. 
342care and Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass 1987). 
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Michigan 
The Nonpublic School Act of Michigan says, "A private, denominational 
or parochial school within the meaning of this act shall be any school other than a 
public school giving instruction to children below the age of 16 years .... "344 One 
of the exemptions to the compulsory attendance requirements is, 
A child who is attending regularly and is being taught in a state 
approved nonpublic school, which teaches subjects comparable 
to those taught in the public schools to children of corresponding 
age and grade, as determined by the course of study for the 
public schools of the district within which the nonpublic schools 
is located 345 
Michigan is one of the few states that has a statutory requirement 
regarding the qualifications of a teacher of a private, denominational or parochial 
school. The statute was adopted in the early 1920's and has withstood court 
scrutiny. 
No person shall teach or give instruction in any of the regular or 
elementary grade studies in any private, denominational or 
parochial school within this state who does not hold a certificate 
such as would qualify him or her to teach in like grades of the 
public school in the state. 346 
344MicH. COMP. LAWS.ANN.§ 388.552 (West 1988). 
345MicH. COMP. LAWS.ANN.§ 80.1561(West1988). 
346MicH. COMP. LAW ANN.§ 388.553 (West 1988). 
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Non-certificated parents claimed the right to educate their children at 
home, free from the certification requirements in Hanson v. Cushman. The United 
States District Court determined that, "[S]tate need not demonstrate a 'compelling 
interest' but only that it acted 'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school and 
that children be taught only by certified teachers. "347 
The parents and clergy of the Sheridan Road Baptist Church and the First 
Baptist Church of Bridgeport brought action against the Department of Education, 
seeking a declaration that the requirements of the nonpublic statute requiring state 
certification was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals found the certification 
requirements "[V]iolated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of 
the first amendment of the United States Constitution. "348 In an equal division, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, based 
on their judgment that the goal of the state requirement of certification prevented 
children from being exposed to unqualified teachers.349 The judges who did not 
concur indicated that the state had the burden to show that the exemption would : 
"[U]nduly impair its interest in compulsory education and that enforcing the 
requirement was the least intrusive means by which to accomplish the objective." 
The dissenting judges stated that the state failed to meet that burden. 350 
347490 F. Supp. 109, 114-115 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
348sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 426 Mich. 462, 396 
N.W.2d 373 (1986), cert.denied, 107 S.Ct. 2183, 95 L.Ed.2d 839 (1987). 
3491ct. 
350Jd. 
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North Dakota 
North Dakota is one of two states that enforces certification requirements 
for the instructors in private schools. The compulsory attendance statute addresses 
the requirements of public and private schools. The State Board document 
describing the policies and procedures adopted by the Department of Public 
Instruction includes home instruction with the criteria for private schools.351 The 
requirement was questioned in the Supreme Court of North Dakota case, State v. 
Shaver,352 by a group of parents, none of whom were certified to teach. These 
parents were convicted of violating the compulsory attendance statute. The parents 
held that seeking certification would violate their religious convictions. The state 
supreme court upheld the lower court decision, holding that, "Teacher certification 
appears to us to be among the least personally intrusive methods now available to 
satisfy the state's prime interest in seeing that its children are taught by capable 
persons. "353 
Texas 
Texas Education Code describes the course of study for children in 
attendance at a private or parochial schools. There is no specific language referring 
351North Dakota Statutory Requirements for Funding of Public Schools and the 
Approval of Private and Parochial Schools, 5 August 1987. 
352state v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). 
353state v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1986). 
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to home instruction. Language in the statutes does not provide the adequate 
direction to avoid litigation. Two cases have resulted in conflicting positions. 
The Court of Appeals of Texas in 1986 held that the parents failed to 
demonstrate that the compulsory school attendance laws substantially burdened 
their exercise of religious beliefs, and consequently the State did not need to prove 
its compelling interest.354 As a rule the courts, if possible, avoided dealing with the 
issue of whether their statutes violated the constitution when they denied the parents 
their right to teach their children at home. 355 
The following year a class action suit in the Tarrant County 17th Judicial 
Court resulted in a favorable decision for home schoolers.356 The interpretation of 
this case was that home schools could legally operate as private schools in Texas. 
There were no specific guidelines for these programs, and it was at the local 
superintendent's discretion to determine if the program was a legitimate program. 
SUMMARY OF COURT CASES AND STATUTES STA TES IN WHICH HOME 
INSTRUCTION QUALIFIES AS A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Although the intent of this research was to examine only cases at the 
United States Supreme Court level and the higher courts at the state and federal 
354nowe/I v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1986). 
355T.M L Case Notes, 24 JOURNAL OFF AMIL Y LAW 552 (1985-86). 
356Leeper v. Arlington Independent School District, No. 17-88761-85 Tarrant County, 
Texas 17th Judicial Ct., Apr. 13, 1987 as reported in C. KLICKA, HOME SCHOOLING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS 47 (Great Falls, Va.: Home School Legal Defense 
Association 1988). 
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level over the past twenty-five years, an exception was made in presenting the 1950 
Levisen357 decision from Illinois and lower court decisions in Texas and 
Massachusetts. Litigation in the states that allowed home instruction programs to 
qualify as private schools provided greater flexibility to the parents. Illinois was an 
example of this flexibility. Unless there was blatant educational neglect, the 
educational program provided to the child was without restriction. 
The Perchemildes decision in Massachusetts stated that once the right to 
home instruction was recognized by state law, the parents had the constitutional 
right to be given: 
[A] high level of procedural due-process protection from 
arbitrary, capricious, or even malicious conduct on the part of 
the authorities who were authorized to evaluate and decide on the 
equivalence of a given program.358 
The issue decided was the procedural means to determine the propriety of 
a home instruction program. The later case of Care and Protection of Charles 
validated the local school district's authority to approve a home instruction 
program. The 1987 lower court decision in Texas has established the direction that 
home instruction be considered a private school. There were no rules to provide 
guidance to the administrators in approval of such programs. 
The statutory language in North Dakota and Michigan required 
certification of the instructor of a private school or an acceptable alternative. 
357People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). 
358Perchemlides v. Frizzle Civil No. 16641 (Hampshire County, Mass. Superior Court, 
Nov. 13, 1978). 
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Kentucky and California had no language requirement for home instruction. Home 
instruction programs have generally been accepted in these two states by the 
authorities to be private schools. 
"SILENT STATUTE" STATES 
The last grouping of states was those having no statutory language at all 
beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility of home 
instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, the state rules and 
regulations, or, if neither of the previous were available, to an individual school's 
discretion. 359 
RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY STA TE BOARDS OF 
EDUCATION 
Although the statutes are silent regarding home instruction or equivalency, 
in two states rules and regulations have been promulgated to establish procedures to 
be used by the appropriate agency in determining if a home instruction program is 
an acceptable exemption to the specific compulsory education requirements. 360 No 
359New Hampshire, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Alabama. 
360New Hampshire, Nebraska. These states were placed in the "silent statute" grouping 
rather than "explicit language" or "equivalent language" groupings because the rules and 
regulations do not have the same impact as does specific language in the statute that directly refers 
to home instruction or equivalent instruction. 
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cases have been identified in the twenty-five years designated for this research in 
these two states. 
Nebraska 
The powers and duties of the Nebraska State Board of Education as 
established in the statutes, includes, "(c) establish rules and regulations which 
govern standards and procedures for the approval and legal operation of all schools 
in the state and for the accreditation of all schools requesting state accreditation. "361 
Title 92, Nebraska Administrative Code, contains three sections for school system 
approval and curriculum. Rule 13, effective date August, 1984, applies to schools 
operated by parents and religious "monitors" who indicate to the Department of 
Education that their deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs do not permit them to 
comply with the approval or accreditation standards. The school is considered an 
"exempt school" which is defined as, "[A] school which has elected not to meet 
approval or accreditation requirements and has complied with the state law and 
regulations relating to such exemptions."362 Rule 13 covers any private religious 
school, whether operated at home, in a school building, or in a church. Rule 14, 
effective June, 1986, includes the regulation and procedures for approving public 
schools; and Rule 15, effective February, 1985, establishes the regulations and 
procedures for accreditation of public and nonpublic schools. 
361NEB. REV. STAT.§ 79-328 (c) (1987). 
362Title 92, Nebraska Department of Education, Ch. 13, at 1 (1984). 
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The parents of Dawn Bigelow were enjoined from operating a school that 
was in violation with the compulsory attendance laws. The state regulations 
provided for approval and required reports and inspection. The court agreed 
Dawn's parents could supplement her education, but could not cause her to be 
truant.363 
New Hampshire 
Home instruction regulations were developed in New Hampshire in 1984. 
The authority to do so was under the provisions of RSA 193:3364 and adopted by 
the procedures of RSA 541-A.365 The recommended standards for a home 
instruction program were stated in the "[F]orm of competencies which the required 
instruction should be reasonably expected to develop in all citizens regardless of 
where they receive their education. "366 The parents were encouraged to seek 
assistance from the local districts and the state agency in the development and/or 
selection of materials. 
363srate ex rel. Douglas v. Bigelow, 334 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Neb. 1983). 
364Brendan Stocklin-Enright, New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandary, 2 
VERMONT LAW REVIEW, 278 (1983). Stocklin-Enright questioned the use of this statutory 
authority since it was intended to provide for the reassignment of students. 
365N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. EDUC. 315, Regulations and Procedures for the Approval of 
Home Education Programs, Section ED 315.01 (1984). 
3661d. Appendix A (1984). 
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NO RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY STATE BOARDS OF 
EDUCATION 
There was no authority for home instruction in the remaining four 
states.367 The legislature had provided no language in the statutes; the state boards 
of education had developed no regulations; and only in Kansas had the court 
recently provided any guidance. 
Alabama 
The Alabama statutes made no specific reference to home instruction. 
Children might be instructed by a private tutor who holds a certificate issued by the 
State Superintendent of Instruction, or they might attend a private school.368 Jerry 
Hill and Kenneth Downing were charged and convicted in separate actions at the 
trial level for failing to cause their children to receive an education that would be an 
acceptable form of compulsory attendance. The parents contended their religious 
freedoms were violated by the Compulsory School Attendance Law. The cases 
were consolidated on appeal. The judgments were affmned. 369 
367 Alabama, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania. 
368ALA. CODE§ 16-28-1, 16-28-5 (1987). Requirements for a private school are listed 
in the statute, including the requirement of teacher certification. 
369mu and Downing v. State, 410 So. 2d 431 (Ala. App. 1981). 
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Kansas 
There was no language available in the Kansas statutes to provide for 
home instruction: 
Home instruction was entirely proper at one time in the history 
of our state (Gen.Stat.1901, § 6420); but a later act of legislature 
deleted the home instruction proviso as a reason for not 
attending school (Laws 1903, ch. 423, Gen. Stat.1909, § 
7736, et. seq.). The present truancy act (G.S. 1949, 72-4801) 
still omits the home instruction proviso.370 
Since 1919 the legislative directive has been to establish minimum course 
requirements for all schools. There are two alternatives to satisfy the Kansas 
compulsory education statutes, attendance in public schools or attendance at "a 
private, denominational or parochial school taught by a competent instructor for a 
period of time substantially equivalent to the period of time public school is 
maintained ... "371 Subsection (e) of the compulsory school attendance section 
provides a special provision applicable to Amish. Approval may be granted for a 
regularly supervised program of instruction to a recognized church or religious 
denomination that objects to a regular high school education. 
In 1983 the Supreme Court of Kansas took the stand that the compulsory 
attendance laws of Kansas had a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose 
of educating its children and that the home education program provided to the 
310state v. Lowry, 383 P.2d 962, 963-64 (Kan. 1963). 
371KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 72-1111 (1980). 
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Sawyer children did not satisfy the compulsory attendance laws.372 The Sawyer 
children were identified as "children in need of care" because they did not attend 
school. The parents had organized their own private schooI.373 The Kansas 
statutes stated: 
[A] private, denominational or parochial school taught by a 
competent instructor for a period of time which is substantially 
equivalent to the period of time public school is maintained in the 
school district in which the private, denominational or parochial 
school is located.374 
The court found, in agreement with the trial court, that Longview School 
was the Sawyer's home, not an accredited private school. In addition it was stated 
that: 
The standard of review, to be applied then, is whether the state's 
system had some rational relationship to a legitimate state 
purpose. . . The Kansas system of compulsory school 
attendance embodied at K.S.A. 72-1111, which allows 
alternatives to public school, had a rational relationship to the 
legitimate State purpose of educating its children.375 
The case notes of the statutes indicated that Sawyer determined that home 
instruction did not meet compulsory attendance requirements in Kansas. 
372/nterest of Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983). 
3731d. at 1094. 
374KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 72-1111(2) (Supp. 1982). 
375/nterest of Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1098. 
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An earlier 1963 case, State v. Lowry,376 found the parents guilty of 
violating the truancy act. The parents claimed their method of educating their 
children was a private school. The court disagreed, finding that in order to be 
classified as a private school the courses of instruction must include those required 
by statute and the children must be taught by a competent instructor for the 
prescribed time as required in the statute.377 
Oklahoma 
The compulsory attendance statute of Oklahoma provides that it is 
unlawful for a parent of a school aged child "[T]o neglect or refuse to cause or 
compel such child to attend and comply with the rules of some public, private or 
other school, unless other means of education are provided for the full term the 
schools of the district are in session. "378 
SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES IN STATES WITH "SILENT 
STATUTES" 
Of this grouping of states with no statutory reference to home instruction, 
three state educational agencies had developed rules and regulations to provide 
3763g3 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1963). 
377Id. at 965. 
3780KLA. STAT. ANN. tit 70, § 10-105(A) (1979). 
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direction to families and school administrators.379 The states with no language, 
either through the statutes or rules and regulations, provided an atmosphere of 
uncertainty for the parents regarding their rights and for the schools regarding their 
responsibility. This uncertainty invited inconsistent interpretations. 
SUMMARY OF COURT CASES AND STATE STATUTES 
Every state had a form of compulsory attendance statute requiring that all 
children of a prescribed age must attend a public or private school. These questions 
were raised in states where there was no reference to home instruction in the statute: 
Does home instruction meet the requirements of the compulsory education statute? 
And if so, under what circumstances? As the justices in North Carolina stated, it 
was an issue of public policy as to whether home instruction should be permitted 
and the legislature should make that determination. 380 
The courts have looked for a balanced approach when weighing the state's 
legitimate interest and the parents' legitimate freedom of choice. The majority of the 
decisions during the twenty-five year period specified for this research were 
concerned with the issue of whether the home instruction program was a legitimate 
exemption under the compulsory attendance law in the designated state. In addition 
to the exemption issue, some home school parents claimed their state statutes to be 
379These states with statutes with no reference to home instruction statutes were referred 
to in this research as states with "silent statutes," even if there were rules and regulations 
promulgated by the state boards of education. 
380Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (1985). 
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unconstitutionally vague although courts have generally resisted deciding the cases 
on a constitutional issue such as this. The burden of proof issue was also a concern 
in a number of cases though this question was most often resolved on the subtleties 
of the particular statutory language. 
The monitoring and approval process varies throughout the country. 
Some states do not require any supervision or approval; however, at the opposite 
extreme, two states go so far as to require the parents to be certified. This 
inconsistency adds to the confusion, particularly for families in our mobile society 
moving from state to state. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TIIREE 
The Third Research Objective served the purpose of tracing the 
development of home instruction in seven states.381 
SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES 
In order to trace the development of home instruction legislation for the 
Third Research Objective, telephone interviews were conducted with administrative 
personnel in seven state educational agencies. It was intended that these in-depth 
interviews would verify and amplify information derived from the earlier written 
survey. These interviews were based on fourteen open-ended questions. The 
3811owa, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. 
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responses to these questions led to a summary of the development of home 
instruction in these seven states, the political forces if any that brought about 
change, and the current status of home instruction, and, finally, recommendations 
for attributes of a model home instruction statute or rules and regulations. In 
identifying the seven states for the in-depth interviewing, the historical background 
of the home instruction laws was considered in order to identify diversity among 
these states. The Objective was to study the process in the development of the 
various statutes and the political influences effecting that development. 
As a result of verifying the information from the original survey, it was 
found there had been legislative changes in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Iowa. The name and citation of the statutes in Minnesota had been changed because 
of new codification in that state. Another change identified was action taken by the 
New York Board of Regents to promulgate regulations to establish procedures to 
assist local school authorities to determine whether a home instruction program was 
essentially equivalent. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOME INSTRUCTION STATUTES 
One of the important segments of the interviews of the personnel of the 
seven state departments of education was to identify any series of events that led to 
modification in the laws of the state. Recent changes have been made in the 
procedures to evaluate a home instruction program in New York, North Carolina, 
Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. 
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There has been an increase of federal and state litigation throughout the 
country challenging home instruction statutes. In New York the courts upheld the 
statutes, but the suits raised critical issues such as the discretion of the local 
superintendents in approving programs and the means to measure the skills of the 
students educated at home. The State Board and other lobbying groups, including 
the state school board association and various parent groups, were looking for 
regulations that had the force of law--not merely the guidelines previously in effect-
-that would clarify the standards in determining if a program were substantially 
equivalent. The regulations adopted by the Board of Regents July 1, 1988, were a 
compromise to protect the rights of all who work with home instruction. The 
perception of the interviewed attorney for the State Board was, "It seems to be 
working at this point. I mean there are bumps and bruises along the way that we 
need to work out, but, for the most part, it is doing what we intended it to do. "382 
Another attorney for the State Board identified the unresolved issues the Board of 
Regents was planning to address if the regulations were to be amended. These 
issues included provisions for handicapped children, procedures to allow the local 
school district and parents to agree on alternate methods of assessing student 
growth, and listing which services provided by the state to the private schools 
should also be provided to home programs. 
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly passed regulations that 
radically deregulated the operation of all nonpublic schools and transferred the 
supervisory authority from the State Board of Education to the Governor's office. 
382Attomey, New York State Board of Education. 
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Many parents taught their children at home after this new monitoring authority was 
established. A subsequent attorney general's opinion stated that a home program 
was not a school within the meaning of the Compulsory Attendance Law. A court 
decision at the federal level then concluded that the state's interest was of sufficient 
magnitude to override the parents' religious interest.383 At approximately the same 
time, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the state statute did not prohibit 
home instruction as an alternate means of complying with the compulsory 
attendance statute. The court reasoned that North Carolina could regulate home 
instruction, prohibit it, or permit it; but the present statute did not contain language 
to do any of these. As a result of these decisions, together with the transfer of the 
authority from the State Board, there were virtually no provisions to meaningfully 
enforce the compulsory attendance law. The court urged the legislature to act. In 
addition the North Carolina State Board of Education saw the obvious need to 
clarify the regulations for home instruction. Legislative action resulted in the 1988 
session. The State Board's initial proposal was for the home instruction teachers to 
be college graduates. Results of the final legislation included (1) a de(inition of 
home schools; (2) the requirement that the teachers have at least a high school 
diploma or its equivalent; and (3) language that established an annual achievement 
test be administered. Still unresolved were the issues of (1) the acceptable level of 
test scores; (2) specificity of the courses taught and at which grade level; and (3) a 
monitoring system to validate that the children were receiving an adequate 
education. The representative from the State Board reported that for the first time 
383Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct 998, 
79 LEd2d 230 (1984). 
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the state has put some real requirements on the public school systems; for example, 
they mandated the length of school day and a basic curriculum. "If we try to get a 
basic education throughout the state, one that equalizes opportunities for all 
students, then it ought to be the same for kids in home schools as well as regular 
schools. "384 
For several years prior to 1985, Minnesota educators sought the 
imposition of regulation for private instruction. Then in that year the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held in the Newstrom and Budke cases that the compulsory 
education law was unconstitutionally vague regarding the requirements of staff 
qualifications. 385 As a result, the legislature called for the establishment of a task 
force composed of six representatives of private education and six representatives 
from public education to develop recommendations for a new compulsory 
instruction law. Compromise legislation provided nonpublic schools with the 
option of going through approved accrediting agencies or following the explicit 
standards established in the statute. 
In 1983 the General Assembly in Wisconsin established criteria for 
defining private schools and home-based private educational programs. The 
impetus for this action was the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling in State v. 
Popanz386 that the lack of definition of "private school" caused the statute to be 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The statute, enacted after the Popanz ruling, 
384Staff member, North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. 
385state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985); State v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 
(Minn. 1985). 
386332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983). 
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clearly established the difference between a home-based private educational 
program and a private school. The administrator of a home-based program or 
private school must make a statement of enrollment to the public school in his or her 
jurisdiction. There were criteria established for private schools, including a 
sequentially progressive curriculum in six content areas. There were no 
administrative rules to monitor or implement the legislation nor an approval process 
at the local level. However, an option which was rarely used was available under§ 
118.167 for approval of a private school by the state superintendent.387 
Pennsylvania's 1988 legislature adopted explicit language in the statutes 
as a result of a federal district court declaring the previous language was 
unconstitutionally vague. Prior to this change, the Pennsylvania compulsory 
education laws had not been amended since 1949. The 1949 statute required daily 
instruction in English language by a qualified private tutor.388 The regulations 
promulgated by the State Board did not define the qualifications for the private 
tutor, but did set forth the required courses for the student and the minimum amount 
of instructional time. The superintendent's approval of the tutor was to be 
acceptable evidence of the tutor's ability to teach the program, and the parents were 
required to furnish written assurance that the instructional requirements were 
met.389 Based on the interview, the best features of the earlier legislation were the 
local control over the approval and the parental responsibility to consider the 
387WJs. STAT.§ 118.167 (1984). 
388PA. STAT. ANN. tit.24 § 13-1326 (1988). 
389chapter 11, Regulations of State Board of Education of Pennsylvania, § 11.31 (b ). 
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qualifications of the tutor as well as the quality of the educational program. The 
disadvantage cited was that the state agency had no knowledge of the student's 
progress. According to the interviewee, the recent unreported federal district court 
case, Jeffrey v. O'Donne//,390 held the statute to be unconstitutionally vague, absent 
the definition of "private tutor." The court ordered that either the State Board must 
develop new regulations or the legislature must adopt a new statute. At the time of 
this research, a bill had just been adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature spelling 
out the required courses, hours of instruction, notification procedure, and 
immunization requirements,. It also provided that a private tutor may be a parent if 
he or she has at least a high school diploma and four more years of education than 
the student. 
In 1983 the Montana statutes were changed to allow home instruction to 
be an exception to compulsory attendance. Prior to that time there was no 
accountability for the education of children taught at home. The county 
superintendents, as elected officials not directly attached to local districts, proposed 
legislation to include periodic testing of students educated at home. The 1983 
legislation was a compromise between strong language proposed by the county 
superintendents and looser requirements advanced by private and home school 
parents who were opposed to the recommended restrictions. 
Iowa was one of the three states which required that instruction in any 
educational program be provided by a certified teacher.391 Rules and regulations 
390No. CV-86-1560, (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 24, 1988). 
391JOWA CODE ANN.§ 299.l (West 1988). 
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were promulgated in 1986 to define more clearly the requirements of the statute. 
The court cases have upheld the compulsory attendance statute, but the legislature, 
after approximately five years of intense lobbying on the part of parents, took action 
in the spring of 1988 to make some changes in the statutory language. In addition 
an interim study committee made up of representatives and senators was established 
to conduct a comprehensive study of the existing compulsory education law. The 
Iowa statute set forth specific criteria for compliance and for criminal prosecution of 
the parents who violated the statute. However, as a result of the 1988 legislative 
action, prosecution may now be deferred as long as the parent meets the 
requirement of reporting that his or child is receiving home instruction.392 One of 
the tasks of the study committee was to determine if the deferred prosecution should 
continue beyond the June 30, 1989 deadline. 
POLffiCAL FORCES 
The political forces that brought about changes in the seven states targeted 
for the interviews included strong parent groups, particularly those with national 
leadership and a religious base. Others including parent advocacy groups, teacher 
unions, National Parent Teachers Association, National Association of School 
Boards, state organizations such as the County Superintendents in Montana, and 
the state departments of education have become visible in the state capitols to lobby 
for their point of view. 
392row A CODE ANN.§ 1. § 279.10 (1987). 
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Teacher qualifications seemed to be the issue throughout the country that 
coalesced supporters of home instruction even if they had disparate religious and/or 
philosophical perspectives. If parents were educating their children at home for 
philosophical or religious reasons, they were equally as concerned that teacher 
certification or a baccalaureate degree not be a requirement of the state home 
instruction laws. 
The consensus of the interviewees regarding local and national trends for 
home education was that it was evident that there has been an increase in the 
number of parents educating their children at home--particularly those who were 
doing it for religious reasons. One of the interviewees believed this to be a cyclical 
movement, declining within the next ten years. 
Many states have legislated outcome based on accountability or 
performance objectives in the public school system. The interviewees questioned if 
the same accountability would be required for all children, even those in private 
schools and those educated at home. 
Further perceptions of the interviewees indicated that the status of home 
education throughout the country depended a great deal on the elections of state 
legislators and the lobbying efforts of teachers unions. These two activities could 
reverse the present trend of home instruction legislation favoring the parents. 
CURRENT STATUS 
The following is a sampling of the responses regarding the unique 
characteristics of home instruction in their states: 
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--North Carolina is becoming a haven for people who want to educate 
their children at home because of the liberal nature of their statute. 
--New York regulations are in place, providing a consistent procedure to 
implement the Education Laws. 
--Montana statute provides that no direct or indirect appropriation of 
payment from any public funds or monies are to be used for any 
sectarian purpose. 
--Montana has home study programs under public supervision in isolated 
areas of the state. 
--Minnesota's statute establishes an accrediting procedure for nonpublic 
schools; and if a school is accredited by one of the recognized 
accrediting agencies, the only information submitted to the local 
superintendent is name, age, and address of the child of compulsory 
school age. 
--Iowa's new statute has placed a moratorium on the prosecution of any 
parent who has reported his program appropriately to the local 
superintendent but is not complying with the other requirements of the 
law. 
--Wisconsin's compulsory age for school attendance is extended to 
eighteen year olds. There is a strong possibility some families may 
choose to establish a home-based program for older students who do 
not fit into the traditional public school setting. 
--The statutes in Pennsylvania at the time of the research have just been 
amended regarding home instruction. A bill provides for parents to file 
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an affidavit giving assurances they are complying with the requirements 
of the statute. 
To identify the current status of home instruction in each individual state, 
the interviewees were asked to list the best and the most troublesome features of the 
authority for home instruction in their state. The respondent from Montana 
identified the best features as (1) the requirement to keep attendance and 
immunization records and (2) inclusion of the requirement to have school for one 
hundred and eighty days. Troublesome features included (1) the lack of required 
qualifications of the person providing the instruction and (2) a concern regarding 
the misconception that students can apply and automatically be accepted to the state 
colleges, as was the case with graduates from accredited high schools, after 
completing a home instruction program with no high school diploma. The 
interviewee summarized his concern in the statement, "We have cases where people 
who didn't even get out of eighth grade are teaching their children at home. "393 
Clarification of the responsibilities of the parties involved in home-based 
programs in Wisconsin was viewed as a positive feature of the current Wisconsin 
statute. A troublesome feature was school census language which did not require 
the parent or private school administrator to indicate the name, address, or birth date 
of the students. Consequently it was impossible to collect accurate information 
regarding all students within the compulsory age group. In addition there was no 
authority to follow up if a complaint was presented regarding a home-based 
program. 
393Legal Department Staff, Montana Office of Public Instruction. 
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In Pennsylvania the language allows for review after one year by the local 
superintendent and consequently contains some elements of local control. 
The individual interviewed in Minnesota stated: 
What this compromise language does is enable the state to assure 
that we do have an educated citizenry in that people are going to 
schools that meet certain minimum qualifications for being a 
school. It ensures first of all that children are in something 
called a school and that that school meets certain minimum 
qualifications. The statute spells out those qualifications much 
more explicitly than the old law did.394 
Local districts and the nonpublic schools identified record-keeping as one 
of the troublesome features of the new legislation in Minnesota. The large 
nonpublic schools that enroll students from throughout the state found it 
cumbersome to report the required pupil accounting information. After the first 
year of the implementation of the new laws, computerized systems were developed 
to assist in the process. Another weakness was the omission of some subjects in 
the minimal curriculum requirements, an example being the omission of economics 
from the social studies curriculum. The concern raised was that once the statute 
was explicit (i.e. social studies includes history, geography, and government), it 
eliminated other areas that might come under the rubric of that curriculum area. The 
qualifications for teachers included the option of successful completion of a teacher 
competency examination, yet such an exam had not been defined in the law. 
394 Assistant Director, Office of Governmental Relations, Minnesota Department of 
Education. 
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The clarification in the 1988 Iowa statutory language of a required one 
hundred twenty days of school attendance fulfilled by thirty days per quarter, 
eliminated the problem of having to wait the one-hundred and twenty days to 
determine if the statutory requirements were being met. It was the prior 
requirement of the one hundred and twenty days that caused the Trucke395 case to 
be remanded and the conviction dismissed. 
Troublesome language included (1) the lack of a definition of what 
constitutes a lesson plan in the reporting requirement; (2) the compliance and 
reporting of the immunization requirements;396 (3) the requirement that parents 
instructing their children at home are mandated child abuse reporters; (4) the 
removal of the imprisonment and fine penalties from the criminal prosecution of 
parents found guilty of not meeting the requirements of the compulsory attendance 
laws §299 leaving only unpaid community service as the penalty;397 and (5) the 
requirement to file an affidavit as to the physical or mental condition of the child 
who was unable to attend schooI.398 
395srate v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d (Iowa 1987). 
396It is questionable if an immunization requirement is as much in the state's interest in a 
program at home, as it would be in a public setting. 
397rowA CODE ANN.§ 299.1(1987). 
398row A CODE ANN.§ 299.5(1987). There is no requirement that the affidavit be given 
by a physician. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODEL LEGISLATION 
Each of the interviewees was asked, "If you were to write model 
legislation regarding home instruction, what would be the components of such 
legislation?" There was consensus that the child's interest should be considered 
and the options not be limited for the child. One interviewee stated, "I think 
legislation should strike a balance and that is what this whole thing is about, the 
balance between the interest in the state in assuring an educated citizenry and 
maintaining private control, private education, and parental responsibility." 
Opinion was divided regarding the benefit of simple statutory language 
supported by extensive regulations or comprehensive statutory language that would 
stand alone. The positive side of regulations was the flexibility in modifying any 
necessary changes that are identified. One respondent indicated that if the 
requirements were not in the statutes they would not be taken seriously. Another 
stated: 
That is more a philosophical issue than a practical issue. I think 
that perhaps the general authority for home instruction should be 
statutory but that the specific mode of implementing it probably 
should be regulatory because I think that the education agency of 
any state is a better place to determine how to implement that 
kind of program. It probably should be initially the legislature's 
judgment whether home instruction should be allowed It would 
ultimately make the most sense if the particular aspects of 
implementation be by regulation. There are obviously 
particularly sensitive issues that the legislatures will want to deal 
with. In most cases regulations make the most sense because 
the state education department is going to be aware of how the 
schools are structured, what kinds of relationships normally 
exists between the superintendents, the pupils, and how best to 
actually institute the program." 
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A concern raised was that educational judgments should be made by 
educators, not legislators. The clear consensus of the interviews was that 
requirements, whether in the statutes or regulations, should not be overly 
restrictive. It was also agreed that the laws should allow for parents to provide an 
alternative to public education and the state's responsibility to develop an educated 
citizenry should not be compromised 
The interviews indicated that the following issues should be considered in 
the development of home instruction legislation. Measuring the child's progress by 
testing or by some alternate method was considered to be important. There was 
consensus that there should be some stipulation regarding the amount of instruction 
required. A concern was raised regarding the establishment of a set number of 
days or hours since a parent could provide instruction for five minutes and consider 
that one full day of the required number of days. It was an accepted premise that a 
comparable length of a normal school day to the required public school day was not 
necessary, for a parent could do more in a shorter period of time. There was a 
strong feeling that a specified number of hours per year should be required and that 
those hours should be fewer for home education than for public school. 
One state department official summarized his thoughts regarding model 
legislation to include (1) clarification of specific pupil accounting information 
assuring accountability of all students; (2) specific time lines as to when the 
program should be registered; (3) limitations as to when in the school year a parent 
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may use the private school/home-based instruction exemption; (4) a means of 
accountability to measure the child's progress; and (5) a procedure to follow if a 
complaint was filed. He also stated that there needs to be cooperation between the 
state department and the strong advocacy groups if the interests of all groups are to 
be satisfied. 
The interviews with the representatives of the seven state departments of 
eduction verified and amplified information from the surveys. More importantly, 
the interviews provided a means to gain deeper insight into the variety of political 
ramifications involved in the issue of home instruction. 
ADDffiONAL DATA 
Since 1980 over thirty states have adopted home instruction legislation or 
have clarified the requirements for such a program. The majority of these changes 
are considered by the research to be more favorable for the parents. To obtain 
additional insight into this home instruction movement, the Chief State School 
Officers were asked on the survey that was sent to them about their perception of 
the home instruction statute in their state. The following choices were provided to 
describe the statute: restrictive, limiting, flexible, adequate, unenforceable, needs 
revision, and other. 399 As indicated in Table VI several respondents checked more 
than one description. Forty-two per cent (n-17) of those who responded found the 
present laws to be flexible, yet another thirty per cent (n-12) felt the present laws 
399 As indicated in Table VI only twenty-three states responded to the question regarding 
perception of the statute. 
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needed revision. None felt the law to be restrictive; one responded that the statute 
was limiting; five felt the laws to be adequate; two found that the law was 
unenforceable; and the remaining three responded "other." 
Several coalitions have formed to lobby in opposition to home instruction 
requirements that were favorable to parents. Professional educational groups, 
including National School Board Association, National Association of State 
Boards, Association of Curriculum and Supervision, National Parent Teachers 
Association, and the National Education Association have either adopted 
resolutions, have issued position papers or have researched the issue. Essentially 
their concerns are the growing number of children educated at home and the 
effectiveness of the lobbying efforts of the parent groups. According to the 
responses to the survey, in seventeen states there has been active political and/or 
lobbying activities; many of these activities have resulted in the passage of flexible 
home school legislation. Table VII lists the specific lobbying groups identified by 
the respondents to the survey. 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Ariz.on a 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Veleware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
lllinios 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisana 
Mame 
Maryland 
Massachuettes 
Michigan 
MUIIleSOta 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North lJakota 
Uhio 
VKiahoma 
Oregon 
PeilT!Sy!varua 
Khode Island 
:south Carolina 
South lJakota 
Tennesse 
lexas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Vrrgmia 
Washington 
West Y rrgmia 
w isconsin 
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Alaska 
illinois 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
New Mexico 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
TABLE VII 
STATEWIDE LOBBYING EFFORTS 
Identified Groups 
Parents of Centralized Correspondence Study 
Ad Hoc Committee for Home Education Legal and 
Legislative Matters 
Parent groups 
Citizens for Home Education 
Walkersville Christian Fellowship Satellite School 
System, Maryland Home Education Association, Alliance 
for Organic Learning 
Home School Association 
Families for Home Education 
Home School Association 
Home Education Association 
Texas Home School Coalition 
Home School Association 
Home Educators Association of Virginia 
Wisconsin Parents Association 
Informal Groups 
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Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Virginia 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SUMMARY 
The dictionary definition of a school is broad, and the courts and the 
legislatures differ among themselves as to the proper organization to provide 
instruction. The state has a compelling interest in assuring that children are 
provided a minimum level of instruction while parents have the right and 
responsibility to provide for their children's education and to determine the suitable 
forum for their education. 
Every state at the time of the research had a form of compulsory 
attendance statute requiring children of a prescribed age to attend a public or private 
school. The question raised in states where there was no statutory reference to 
home instruction was "does home instruction come under the requirements of the 
compulsory education statute?" 
Parents, school administrators, and the public were understandably 
confused about their rights and responsibilities. This confusion lead to ill will, 
resentment, and ignorance. 
150 
151 
Parents were becoming a vocal force, working either through litigation or 
through lobbying efforts, to liberalize the statutes. Litigation efforts were becoming 
better organized, and parents were receiving more sophisticated legal consul to 
avoid prosecution and possible arrest. 
Was the compulsory attendance requirement met by home education, and 
if so under what conditions? Yes, home instruction was an acceptable alternative to 
compulsory education and the conditions to fulfill that choice were identified in each 
state. The courts have continued to uphold legislation that clearly prescribed the 
requirements and provided for proper monitoring to insure children received an 
adequate education. 
The necessity of continuing to search for better and clearer answers to the 
questions in this study is the right and obligation of all involved in the education of 
the children of this country. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research objectives of this study covered general areas of both 
statutory and case law of the fifty states related to home instruction plus an in-depth 
study of seven states. The specific language of the objectives was as follows: 
The First Research Objective was to review and analyze the compulsory 
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in the fifty states with 
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognized and permitted home 
instruction. Data for this analysis were gathered from several sources: 
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--The statutes and regulations themselves, with an examination of the 
legislative history in proper cases 
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and 
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments 
of education, and representatives of professional organizations. 
The Second Research Objective was to review and analyze the relevant 
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past 
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century. 
This analysis described trends and identified those issues which were most often 
addressed by the courts' attention: 
--Inherent parental rights regarding education, 
--Interest of the state regarding education, 
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment), 
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes (United States 
Constitution, fourteenth amendment), 
--Burden of proof, 
--Equivalency of home instruction, and 
--Qualifications of instructor. 
The cases were then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and 
regulations in the respective states to determine what if any legislative action had 
followed the court action. 
The Third Research Objective was to trace in seven specific states, 
through further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation. The 
intent was for these interviews to amplify and verify the information obtained from 
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the written surveys. Specific attention in these case studies was directed to the 
political or lobbying efforts, if any, that influenced such legislation and to identify 
the most desirable elements of model legislation and/or administrative procedures. 
PROCEDURES 
This study was primarily descriptive in nature using appropriate qualitative 
methods to obtain data. The three methods used were survey, interview, and legal 
research. This methodology, the presentation that included tabular data and 
narrative documentation, disclosed historical development, current practice, and 
future trends. 
The compulsory education and/or home instruction statutes in the fifty states 
were researched and categorized. These statutes and supporting laws were 
identified by independent research and through the information obtained from the 
survey sent to the fifty chief state school officers. 
Cases at the federal and state level were studied primarily for their 
interpretation of statutory language regarding both the state's interest and the 
parents' rights. Court decisions involving home instruction and the compulsory 
education statutes and administrative rules and regulations from the states were 
analyzed, compared, and contrasted. Particular attention was given to Illinois court 
decisions to determine if an Illinois "public policy" was identifiable. Such a policy 
was established by the Illinois supreme court in the Levisen decision. 
Follow up telephone interviews were conducted with designated 
personnel in seven state education departments. The purpose of the interviews was 
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to validate the already collected data and to gather information regarding the political 
forces that affected the legislative process. 
As a result of the research, recommendations were made for the 
development of legislation in the states in which there was no explicit authority for 
home instruction. The recommendation included elements that should be in statutes 
or regulations for home instruction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The central question raised in this research was this: Is the compulsory 
attendance requirement met by home instruction, and if so under what conditions? 
The following conclusions demonstrate that this requirement is satisfied under a 
variety of circumstances. These circumstances vary throughout the fifty states. In 
some cases home instruction is permitted by specific statutory enactment while in 
other cases it is permitted by court decisions. Additionally in a limited number of 
jurisdictions home instruction is practiced by default, that is, with neither legislative 
nor judicial sanction. 
1. Parents may choose educational alternatives for their children. but the 
state has a right to regulate these choices within certain limits. Parents believe it is 
their right and responsibility to provide for their children's education and to decide 
what is the proper forum for that instruction. However, the state has a compelling 
interest in assuring that children are provided a minimum level of instruction. The 
amount of litigation and the extensive lobbying efforts over the past twenty-five 
years is evidence of this dichotomy. The research has confirmed that the parents 
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have judicially protected rights in this area. The dual roles of the state and the 
parents are not free from conflict. 
2. State and federal courts generally agreed that home instruction is a 
public policy issue that should be decided by the particular state. The Supreme 
Court has ruled that education is the responsibility of the state. Where such a 
public policy was found to exist, the state legislature may recognize it through 
appropriate legislation. 
3. All fifty states have compulsory attendance statutes which provide for 
private school attendance but do not necessarily allow home instruction as an 
exemption to the compulsory attendance statute. Over fifty years ago the Supreme 
Court established both the propriety of private schools as an acceptable alternative 
to public schools and that the state could not deny this choice because of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, other federal court and 
state court decisions have held that the denial of home instruction as an alternative to 
public education does not violate the Constitution. 
4. Most court cases have rejected religious claims as reasons for parents to 
provide their children with home instruction. The only Supreme Court decision 
dealing with home instruction recognized the firm and long established religious 
beliefs of the Amish. It was believed by most authorities that only where the 
religious interest is of such unique strength will it receive sufficient constitutional 
recognition to qualify as an exemption to the compulsory attendance statute. 
5. Sincerity of beliefs and quality of a program are not enough if the 
parents do not comply with the statutes. The courts will not accept programs that 
violate the requirements of the state laws or that deprive children of their rights to an 
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adequate education. The role of the courts is to interpret and enforce the laws of the 
states, not to evaluate the value of a home instruction program or the religious 
convictions of the parents. 
6. Home instruction will not gualify as a private school if the compulsory 
attendance statute clearly establishes separate reguirements for home instruction and 
private schools. To avoid the specific requirements of home instruction, parents 
often call their program a "private school." Courts have found this tactic to be 
unacceptable if home instruction is defined and provided for in the statutes. 
7. The number of states that have statutory authority or regulations for 
home instruction has increased in the 1980s. Most of these legislative actions have 
been a reaction to court decisions and lobbying efforts. At the time of the research, 
twenty-six states have explicit statutory language to allow for home instruction. 
The statutory or case law in seven states allows for home instruction to fulfill the 
private school exemption of compulsory attendance. In twelve states, home 
instruction is an acceptable exemption if the program is equivalent, comparable, or 
regular and thorough. In five states there is no statutory authority or case law to 
provide for home instruction as is the condition in the other forty-three states. 
Three of these five states with "silent statutes" rules and regulations have been 
promulgated to establish procedures to be used by the appropriate agency in 
determining if a home instruction program is an acceptable exemption to a specific 
compulsory attendance requirement. In the four remaining states, there is no 
direction to determine the acceptability of such a program. 
8. The state's utilization of its authority to regulate education by 
monitoring and approval of home instruction programs varies throughout the 
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country. The approval process happens when the parents indicated their intent to 
educate the child at home. Monitoring activities include home visitation, testing, 
and other means of evaluating the student's progress. The compelling interest of 
the state in adequate education for its citizens has met the constitutional test for 
allowing governmental regulations. The state's authority to regulate home 
instruction, either through monitoring or approval, is a point of contention between 
the state and the parents. The issue raised in many court cases is how much 
regulatory control the state has over the education of the children. An analysis of 
the cases showed that if the procedural requirements for approval of a home 
instruction program are reasonable and clear and there are due-process 
opportunities, the state's interest persists over the parents. 
9. The burden of proof is on the parents to show that they are providing 
their children with a proper education and are following the reguirements of the 
state laws. The burden of proof for verification of non-attendance is on the state. 
Tobak and Zirkel describe in their writings the importance of this conclusion of the 
sharing of the burden of proof stating; "[T]he balanced approach considers both the 
state's interest in education and the parent's freedom to choose. In addition, and 
perhaps most importantly, it permits a greater focus on the best interests of the 
individual child. "400 
In analyzing statutes and judicial decisions, three principles must be kept 
in mind: (1) regulating education is the responsibility of the respective states; (2) 
each state should determine whether its public policy should permit home 
400roBAK AND ZIRKEL, supra note 136, at 6-10. 
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instruction; and (3) it is up to the legislature of each state to codify that public policy 
into proper legislation. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
the United States Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right 
provided for in the United States Constitution; but educating children is a legitimate 
state function, to be carried out in compliance with constitutional safeguards.401 
The legislature in each state must determine if home instruction tends to be injurious 
to the public or against the public good. If not, then it is proper public policy. The 
courts have continued to recognize that if home instruction is proper public policy, 
it is the legislature's responsibility to provide for this form of education in the laws 
of the state. 
RECOMMEND A TIO NS 
A structure for alternatives to public education, particularly that of home 
instruction, is imperative.402 The more clearly the structure is defined the less likely 
litigation will happen. A structure does not necessarily imply state control. 
Ambiguity in the statutes and other laws in the states have resulted in litigation and 
unnecessary expense and frustration. In states where there is no explicit authority 
for home instruction, legislation is needed and that legislation should be a balance to 
401san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
402Nanette Barrett has developed a suggested "Home Education Act" for the American 
Legislative Exchange Council. The act would exempt students from compulsory attendance if he 
or she was provided a program at home. The student's skills would be assessed annually. Nancy 
Barrett, EDUCATION SOURCE BOOK: nm STATE LEGISLATORS' GUIDE FOR REFORM 11 
(Washington: American Legislative Exchange Council 1985). 
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protect the interest of the state and the parents' rights. Home instruction should be 
a specific exemption identified in the compulsory attendance statute. It should not 
be included under the private school exemption, nor should implied equivalency 
language be used. The legislation may take the form of explicit comprehensive 
language in the statutes or explicit language in the statutes to provide authority to the 
state board of education to develop regulations regarding home instruction. At a 
minimum statutes and/or regulations should not be overly restrictive. The laws 
should be flexible but clearly stated. There should be options for compliance. The 
law should include 
--clearly stated definition of terms including home instruction, private 
schools, instruction, course of study, and equivalency; 
--an accounting procedure to identify all students of compulsory 
attendance age; 
--a procedure to file statement of intent; 
--options to evaluate the competency of the instructor; 
--a statement of minimum academic standards; 
--a minimum number of hours of instruction per year or a clearly stated 
definition of a school day; 
--provisions for support to the parent by a certified teacher or an 
accredited institution; 
--accountability procedure for identifying the student's progress; 
--a monitoring procedure to verify if the child is receiving an adequate 
education;403 
-a clearly established authority for enforcement of the laws; 
-due process procedure; and 
-a means to protect the child from educational neglect. 
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Parents in an increasingly mobile society who choose to educate their 
children at home should not be subjected to different standards, tests, and criteria 
simply because their address changes. A child's education should not be a 
function of geography. A uniform home instruction law adopted by all states 
would solve that problem and reduce the uncertainty about home instruction. 
Indeed at least one expert, attorney David A. Splitt, has written: 
Differences in home schooling legislation from state to state 
reflect our long standing tradition of local control of public 
education. But, they also give home schoolers and their lawyers 
plenty of opportunity to haggle over the wording of state laws 
that basically are constitutionally sound. Some uniformity in 
home schooling laws might reduce the legal wrangling simply 
by giving more weight to legal language that already has been 
tested in courts ... 
It would help if someone went a step further and recommended a 
uniform home schooling law based on state statutes that have 
passed judicial muster. A uniform policy might look like a spot 
of tarnish on the holy grail of local control, but it would go a 
4030riginal approval of a home instruction program was purposefully excluded from the 
list Monitoring was to verify compliance. 
long way toward reducing confusion and litigation over home 
schooling.404 
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In many states public school administrators and parents are uncertain of 
their legal rights and responsibilities regarding home instruction because of 
ambiguity in laws or recent decisions in courts. School administrators grope for 
guidance in their dealings with families who are interested in educating their 
children in the non-traditional setting of home instruction. 
Schools and their administrators and parents should be aware of their 
rights and responsibilities. Cooperation between the two would be in the best 
interest of the students. The desirable end goal of education should be agreed to by 
all parties. That goal should be stated broadly in terms of the ultimate product, the 
student. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
1. This study has concentrated on the laws of the states and the rights of 
the parents. Future study should explore the rights of children and their input into 
the means by which they are educated. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion 
in Yoder, stated: "These children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of 
Rights"405 and "On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children 
should be entitled to be heard "406 
404David Splitt, School Law, EXECUTIVE EDUCATOR 8 (Dec. 1988). 
405wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972). 
406Id. at 244. 
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2. According to the results of the survey, thirteen states have laws 
establishing the requirements for home instruction for special education students.407 
Future study should research these laws and their relationship to the federal and 
state legislation protecting the rights of handicapped students. As a part of this 
future study, a definitive position should be found regarding the responsibilities of 
the public school if the parents of a handicapped student choose the alternative of 
home instruction. 
3. A follow-up study looking at the court decisions in the late 1980s, as 
related to the statutes and regulations enacted in the late 1970's and 1980's, would 
be profitable to determine if requirements of new laws are less arbitrary and vague 
in the minds of the courts. 
4. As more states develop outcome-based accountability or performance 
objectives for the public school students, future study could seek to identify the 
educational outcome requirements placed on nonpublic educational alternatives. 
407 Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Wyoming. 
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choice of education for their children. 
No merits on freedom of religion claim. 
Sincerely held religious convictions are not 1st amendment defense. Howells failed to show reversible error. 
Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague. Juvenile court bears the burden of proof to show 
equivalency. 
Home school not private school as defined in statute, state standards are appropriate and have rational relationship to 
state purpose. Education is not a fundamental right. 
...... 
CXl 
O'I 
CASE 
Johnson v. 
Charles City 
Comm. School Bd. 
Kentucky State 
Bd., Etc. v. 
Rudasill 
Lemon v. 
Kurtzman 
CASE HOLDINGS (con't) 
HOLDING 
Upheld reporting and teacher certification requirements. Remand to district court for definition of equivalent 
instruction. 
Appropriate monitoring of private schools such as testing is acceptable, requiring certification or determining 
appropriate textbooks is not acceptable. 
Developed three-prong test to determine state's neutral position when Church/State cases are litigated. 
Matter of Adam D. Upheld the local schools responsibility to determine the equivalency of the home instruction program. 
Matter of Andrew Parents, found guilty of neglect, failed to provide school officials with proof that the instruction the children received 
"TT" at home met equivalency requirement. 
Matter of Falk Parents met burden of proof that they were providing instruction that is substantially equivalent. 
Matter of Franz Statute Is constitutional. One and one-half hours per day of instruction is not substantially equivalent. 
Children 
Mazanec v. North Plantiffs denied relief in civil rights claim because they frustrated attempts to verify compliance with law. 
Judson-San 
Pierre School 
Corporation 
CASE 
CASE HOLDINGS (con't) 
HOLDING 
Meyer v. Nebraska Invalidated state law prohibiting teaching of a modern language other than English to students. 
Murphy v. State Courts upheld law that students taught at home take same standardized test as public school students as it established 
the least restrictive system to assure its goal of adequately educating its citizens. 
People v. Levisen Statute does not determine the manner and place a child should be educated. Parents have burden of showing an 
adequate course of instruction is provided. This particular prograr,n is a private school. 
Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters 
State statute recognizing only public education interfered with parents liberties. The state did not have the power to 
regulate, inspect, supervise and examine all schools. 
Roemhild v. State Statute was unconstitutionally vague in lack of defining "private school." 
San Antonio Education is not a fundamental constitutional right protected by Equal Protection. Education is the responsibility of the 
School District v. state. 
Rodriguez 
Scoma v. Chicago Statute is not vague, burden of proof is on the parents. Home instruction could qualify as public school as long as it 
Board of was commensurate with public school standards. 
Education 
Sheridan Road Certification requirement upheld, does not alone violate Establishment Clause. 
Baptist Church v. 
Department of 
Education I-' 
CX> 
CX> 
CASE 
State Ex Rel. 
Douglas v. 
Bigelow 
CASE HOLDINGS (con't) 
HOLDING 
Non-certified parent is enjoined from operating a school in violation of law. 
State v. Bowman Statute is not unconstitutionally vague and approval authority was acceptable. 
State v. Buckner Clear prohibition of unqualified parent from teaching a child at home under guise of private school. Remanded for 
determination if private school was established. 
State v. Budke Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Davis State failed to prove parents didn't provide equivalent education. Urged legislature to make necessary changes in the 
law. 
State v. Edgington Statute rationally related to state interest in compulsory attendance and does not violate the 14th amendment Equal 
Protection Clause. 
State v. Lowry Parents claim they operated a private school. Court found It did not meet statutory requirements. 
State v. M.M. and Private school not established because mother was not a qualified tutor as required by the statute. 
S.E. 
....... 
00 
l.O 
CASE 
State v. 
McDonough 
CASE HOLDINGS (can't) 
HOLDING 
Parents refused to submit plan. 14th amendment claim unfound. 
State v. Moorhead Equivalency and curriculum requirements are clear. Free exercise burden on party challenging. 
State v. 
Newstrom 
Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague for purpose of imposing criminal penalties. 
State v. Patzer Teacher certification is the least personally intrusive method to satisfy state's prime interest. 
State v. Popanz Term "private schools" in compulsory attendance statute is vague and thus is unconstitutional as applied to 
prosecutions involving private schools. 
State v. Riddle 1st and 14th amendment violations denied. Sincerity, dedication and competency are excuse for non-compliance with 
statute. Statute not vague, instead considered flexible. 
State v. Schmidt Statute is not vague, it reasonably furthers the state's interest in education of its citizens, requirement to seek local 
superintendent approval is appropriate and doesn't infringe on free exercise of religion. 
State v. Shaver Minimal requirements for state approval are in best interest of state. 
I-' 
l.O 
0 
CASE HOLDINGS (can't) 
CASE HOLDING 
State v. Trucke Reversed because conviction based on crimes not yet committed (120 day attendance requirement). 
State v. Whisner Minimum stanQards for private schools were too restrictive. Required state to show compelling interest. 
State v. Yoder Court placed burden of proof on state to show compelling interest. Narrow ruling applied to Amish due to strong 
religious conviction. 
APPENDIXC 
DRAFT SURVEY SENT JUNE 25, 1987 
Gary Johnson 
State Dept. of Public Instruction 
125 South Webster Street 
Madison, WI 53707 
Barbara Mertens 
Old Capitol Bldg. 
Mail Stop FG-11 
Olympia, WA 98504 
Chris Pipho 
Education Commission of States 
1860 Lincoln Street #300 
Denver, CO 80295 
Edith Helmich 
State Board of Education 
100 North First Street 
Springfield, IL 62777 
Jim Franks 
Arkansas Dept. of Education 
#4 Capitol Mall #403A 
Little Rock, AK 72201 
Mary Lou Palmer 
10325 Fall Creek Road 
Lincoln, NE 68510 
Terry Thomas 
Oakland Schools 
Pontiac, MI 48054 
Robin Johnson 
State Dept. of Education 
201 E. Colfax 
Denver, CO 80203 
Barry Sullivan 
Dept. of Education 
720 Capitol Square Bldg. 
St. Paul, MN 55101 
Roberta Stanley 
State Dept. of Education 
P.O. Box 30008 
Lansing, MI 48909 
Don Henderson 
Associate Professor 
University of Alabama 
Birmingham, AL 35233 
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WILLIAM L. THOMPSON 
Regional Superintendent of Schools 
County Building A904, Waukegan, Illinois 60065 Telephone (312) 360-6313 
!FIRSTNAME! !LASTNAME! 
!ADDRESS! 
!CITYSTZIP! 
Dear !FIRSTNAME!: 
June 25, 1987 
Thanks so much for the information you have provided me regarding 
home instruction. It seems as if I am becoming acquainted via the 
phone and mail with an interesting group of people in state agencies 
and in a variety of other educational positions that are all 
concerned with home instruction. 
I am finalizing my survey for the chief state school officers and 
would appreciate your input before I send it out. My primary goal in 
distributing the survey is to obtain any information that will not be 
readily available through normal research. An example of this is 
information regarding rules and regs developed to implement the 
statutes. It seems as if the statutes are secondary in terms of 
local and state administration. Another example of information I 
hope to obtain is the process states used to develop and influence 
legislation. 
As I have begun my research I have come across several charts 
documenting state statutes, but I am fearful they are no longer 
accurate. One of my final goals is to develop an up to date chart 
such as this from an unbiased perspective. 
My last favor to ask of you is do you have any idea how I can be 
certain my survey is acted on in the state agencies. I know they 
receive so many of these. Chris Phipo from the Education commission 
of the States recommended I identify 2 or 3 chief state school 
officers to endorse the research project and to cosign the cover 
letter. Do you think your chief would consider doing this? 
Thanks in advance for your cooperation. I am enclosing a stamped 
return envelope for your convenience. I'd appreciate your input by 
July 15th if possible. 
Sincerely, 
Sybil Yastrow 
Assistant Superintendent 
LAKE COUNTY 
Regional Superintendent 
of Schools 
Sybil Yastrow 
Regional Superintendent 
Edward Gonwa 
Assistant Regional Superintendent 
195 
18 North County • A904 • Waukegan, Illinois 60085-4362 
312-360-6313 
MAILED TO CHIEF SCHOOL OFFICERS 
October 30, 1987 
As you are aware, there is a growing trend throughout the country of parents educating 
their children at home. As the Regional Superintendent of Lake County, Illinois, I have watched 
the numbers increase in our county. Illinois has no statutory provisions for home instruction. The 
confusion as to the rights and responsibilities of both the parents and school administrators has 
become more evident each year. 
It is my intent to research this issue. The purpose of the research is to examine home 
instruction from a national perspective in terms of the applicable statutory and case law, as well as 
rules and regulations. Based on this analysis, I will propose model criteria for home instruction 
legislation and regulations. The goal is to provide information to local districts, state agencies and 
lawmakers in Illinois to assist them in the development of policies, rules and regulations and laws 
relating to home instruction. 
Ted Sanders, the Superintendent of Illinois State Board of Education, has lent his support 
to this research as indicated in the enclosed letter. I would appreciate your support by completing 
the enclosed questionnaire. The law books cannot provide all of the information. I am certain the 
most meaningful information I can obtain will be from state educational agencies that deal with the 
situations on a regular basis. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Please feel free to call me collect if you have 
any questions. 
Sincerely, 
Sybil Yastrow 
Regional Superintendent of Schools 
Lake County 
Illinois 
State Board of 
Education 
196 
Ted Sanders 
100 North First Street 
Springfield. Illinois 62777-0001 
2171782-4321 
Thomas Lav Burroughs. Chairman 
lllm0ts Stare Board of Educa110n State Su(JfJrmtendent of Educat10n 
September 25, 1987 
Ms. Sybil Yastrow 
Regional Superintendent of Schools 
County Building A904 
Waukegan, Illinois 60085-4362 
Dear Sybi 1, 
I am happy to cooperate with you in obtaining information you need in 
preparing your doctoral dissertation. 
The topic you have chosen to examine on home instruction is an important 
and timely one. I hope my collegues will give their cooperation in 
completing the survey to assist you in this important endeavor. 
Best personal wishes on your project. 
\]J~J Te't¥J;/~ 
State Superintendent of Education 
Southern lllinots Regional Offtce 
F•rst Bank and Trust Bu1k11ng 
Su1te214.123South 10th Street 
Mt V~mon, lllino.s 62864-4013 
618/242-1676 
An Eoual ()poonumty!Aff1rmat11,e Action EmDIOY'H' 
Telecommun1cat1ons Device for the Deaf fTOOI 
2171782-1900 
State of Illinois Center 
Suite 14-300 
100 West RandolPh 
Ch.cago. IU1nois 60601-3405 
3121917-2220 
I. 
2. 
I IOME INSJ'ROCrtON SURYEX 
Ooes your stale have a compulsory allendance/cJucation statute'! 
Yes No 
Ir yes, please send a copy of slalllle. 
Ones your stale have a slalulory rcqujremenl for reporling all students coVL'fed by 
compulsory allendance/cJucalion? 
Yes No 
If yes, please send a copy of the slalule. 
If yes, lo whom is the reporting done7 
If yes, docs it require that all students in all educational settings be included in the data? 
Public School Yes No 
Non-puplicSchool Yes No 
llome Instruction Yes No 
If no, is there a stale educational department procedure used lo gather these data? 
Yes No 
(If yes, please send a copy of the procedures). 
J. Ones your stale have spccilic slalulory language referring lo home instruction? 
4. 
Yes No 
If yes, please send a copy of the statute and answer the following. 
The slalule is: (mark as many as appropriate) 
restrictive 
limiting __ 
unenforceable 
nexible 
adequate __ 
needs revision 
other __ 
Ones your slate have a slalule dealing with non public (private) schools which include home 
instruction as a form of non public school? 
Yes No 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
n· YOU 1ms1•0NIJEIJ l'OSITIVEI. y TO Jon 4 - l'IWCEEIJ. 
IF NOT, !'I.EASE GO TO# 11. 
Ooes lhe slalule referring lo home instruction in your slate fall under :uiy of the three following 
categories: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Spccificall y prov ides for home instruction. 
Yes No 
Allows for home instruction if the home qualifies as a private school. 
Yes No 
Allows for home instruction, by implication, with statutory language 
(e.g. "equivalent education elsewhere.") 
Yes No 
Other(pleasespccify) _______________ _ 
Has your agency developed any rules, regulations and/or procedures lo implement the home inslrUctinn 
stalules? 
Yes No 
Jr yes, please send a copy. 
Are you awue of any political or legislative activities thal resuhed in the passage of home school 
legislation (forexunple: lobbying groups)? 
Yes No 
Please describe. 
Who ha.• lbe aulhorily to regulate home instruction in your slate? 
(Select as many as appropriate) 
Stale agency__ Intermediate Agency __ 
Otlicr(plea•espccify) _____________ _ 
Local School Oistricl 
I-' 
l.O 
-.J 
9. Whal is source of this authority? (Select as many as appropriate) 
Stalule 
10. 
Rules & Regulations-~­
Other (please specify) __ 
Docs your agency monitor home instruction programs? Yes No 
Docs your agency monitor non public schools? Yes No 
If your response was yes lo eillicr of above, describe the monitoring procc.<s (i.e., all reponing forms, 
testing, on site monitoring, other). 
11. Please list the most important coun cases (federal or state) in your state dealing with home instruction? 
(any descriptor will be sufficient) 
12. Is there any pending litigation in the slate or federal courts in your slate relating lo home instruction? 
Yes No 
13. Ha.< your allomey general or state educ.tional agency legal dcpanmenl provided legal opinions regardin1 
home instruction? 
Yes No 
U your response was yes, please include copies or describe. 
14. Does your agency provide support lo ll1e local educational agency administrators for dealing with the 
home instruction of sludenl<"! 
Yes No 
-- --
If yourresponse was yes, please describe (i.e., seminars, guidelines, rc1m1ing forms). 
15. Are there any specific requirements in your stale regarding special education students (as defined in 
Public Law 94-142) who are educated al home? 
Yes No 
-- --
.,. Would you like a compilation of data gained from this survey? Yes 
--
No 
--
State 
Person completing survey 
Position 
Address 
City Zip 
Phone 
AnydoclUJIDlls( statutes, rules and regulatiotu, court cases, task force reports) to support this survey 
would~ appreciaud. If there are any tluplicati'1g or postage costs plea<e ;,,dude with the material.v a bill for 
~imbUTSl!ntenl. 
PLEASE Rlo:TURN TO: SYAIL YASTROW 
REGIONALSUf'r.OFSCllCX>LS 
ROOM A904 COUNTY BUILDING 
18 N.COUNTY STREET 
WAllKEGAN, ILLINOIS 61Nl85 
APPENDIXD 
CONTACTS FOR CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS 
STAIB CONTACT CA1EGORYOF 
HOME 
INSTRUCTION 
AUTIIORTIY 
Iowa Kathy Collins Legal Consultant Equivalent 
Department of Public Instruction 
Minnesota Barry Sullivan Government Relations Explicit 
Department of Education 
Montana Bob Stockton, Executive Assistant Explicit 
to Legal Services, Office Of Public Instruction 
New York Carl Friedman, Bureau of Pupil Support Services; Equivalent 
Richard Troutwein, David Steever, 
Legal Departtnent; 
The State Education Deparnnent 
North Carolina Kay Oney, North Carolina Department of Explicit 
Public Instruction 
Pennsylvania Joe Bard, Department of Education Explicit 
Wisconsin Marvin Berg, Consultant Department Explicit 
of Public Instruction 
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QUESTIONS FOR PHONE SURVEY 201 
November, 1988 
The purpose of the phone survey to five state offices of education is to gain a clearer 
insight into the statutory authority and its development in the area of home instruction. 
Verify information from original survey: 
1. The year of the most recent change in the compulsory education statutes in your 
state. 
Pertinent information from the statute. 
2. Cite authority if any for home instruction in state. 
Pertinent information from the statute. Verify grouping. 
3. Important court cases over the past 20 years. 
Questions: 
1. Is your state unique in terms of home instruction, i.e., strong language, large 
population with religious sentiment directed to home instruction, court precedent? 
2. Best features in statutory language. 
3. Most troublesome languange. 
4. Are there any state funds available to support any part of the home school 
statutory language, i.e., state aid to districts for students, testing, monitoring, 
etc.? 
5. Chronological sequence of changes in legislations. 
6. Describe the outside forces if there were any that precipitated these changes. 
7. Predict any trends in your state regarding home instruction. 
8. What would be the forces that would cause these? 
9. Predict any national trends regarding home instruction. 
10. What would be the forces that would cause these? 
11. If you were to write the model legislation regarding home instruction, what would 
be the components of it? 
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